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Abstract:
Modern historical memory of the American Civil War is dominated by the domestic
elements of the four-year conflict between the Union and Confederacy. The military
figures, battles, and major political changes of 1861-1864 are central elements to public
interpretation of the Civil War. But there is an additional dimension to the events of this
period in American history, one that, outside of secondary scholarly research in the past
century, remains distant from public knowledge. This research explores the nature of
international reaction to the American Civil War, focusing on interaction between the
combatants and the United Kingdom. The heart of Empire and the foremost world power
in the mid-19th century, the British response to events across the Atlantic places domestic
events of the war in greater context. The impact of the conflict was not limited to waves
of domestic change. Though no foreign power officially entered the war on either side, its
influence appeared in the social, political and economic issues of the 1860s. Generating
periods of controversy and upheaval in Anglo-American relations, the Civil War,
interpreted in this way, finds a place in the international affairs of the period. Exploring
the development of this relationship, the research was conducted with a further purpose –
for use in the creation of public web-based resource addressing the issues of this sphere
of Civil War history. The product’s aim is to convey international contexts to the conflict,
interpreting matters of diplomacy, public opinion, and lasting effects upon the U.S. and
U.K.
Keywords: American Civil War, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Union, Confederacy, United
Kingdom
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Introduction
The American Civil War, fought from 1861 to 1865, is remembered today as a
conflict between Americans that threatened to split the country permanently. Escalating
out of longstanding divisions over the political and economic influence of the North and
South, the war altered the course of the country’s development. Formed from the
inception of the nation, the war occupies a unique place in American historical memory.
Battlefields and museums preserve the stories of the war – its landscapes and battles, its
politics and personal experiences. Common narratives of the Civil War evoke the
perception of an American society turned inward, focused on an internal conflict with no
external influence. As the name suggests no outside powers were directly involved in the
conflict, which remained entirely between the Union and Confederacy. Yet the conflict
remained of interest to the outside world. Though it wasn’t the foremost interest of
European powers such as Britain, France and Russia - themselves embroiled in the ever
shifting rivalries and alliance systems of the continent – the Civil War reached them as
well.
Furthermore, the importance of international perceptions and responses to the war
was not lost on the leadership of the American belligerents. For the North, the Lincoln
administration recognized the threat posed by a South bolstered by foreign trade and
diplomatic recognition or support. The South was largely dependent on its external
connections to attain necessary goods, even before entering a state of war with the North.
Its agriculturally-based society, with limited manufacturing, necessitated trade with
external partners, a lifeline largely cut off by the Union’s blockade. The Confederacy’s
hope was rooted in the intervention or mediation in the conflict by outside powers, the
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potential for their recognition as an independent entity also being the doorway to renewed
ties of trade. To attain their goals, and to undermine the other, both sides moved towards
diplomatic action to move events in their favor.
Thus the full story of the American Civil War encompassed more than the
battlefield landscapes and the streets of cities like Washington D.C. and Richmond. The
international story of the conflict, one largely behind the scenes from the campaigns, is
rooted in diplomacy and outreach; propaganda and persuasion. Though no other power
involved itself in the war, it is necessary to understand why this was the case. What
factors inhibited foreign participation? What economic, political or social interests drove
the U.S. contemporaries to remain on the sidelines? This research aimed to analyze these
aspects of Civil War foreign policy, focusing on the most prominent case within the
subject. As the leading power in the world, the diplomatic relations and interactions
between the American belligerents and the British Empire provided the most significant
example for interpretation.
In the mid-19th century, the British Empire would soon be reaching the height of
its power in the Victorian Age, ruler of the oceans and spanning across four continents by
the Age of Imperialism. Its economic growth led Europe, and later the United States, into
the Industrial Revolutions of the early century, and had maintained a dominant position in
global manufacturing and trade since. This status, along with their shared history, made
the British central to diplomatic efforts of the North and South. The outbreak of secession
and Civil War in America presented a challenge for British interests. Competing
economic incentives for and against different forms of intervention, with general
disinterest in involving the nation, shaped internal and diplomatic discussion. Ultimately,
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the desire for neutrality remained dominant in public and government feeling. Reinforced
by the increasing inevitability of a Northern victory, the prospect of British intervention,
or any significant action on behalf of the South, rapidly diminished over the latter half of
the war.
Concerning the Anglo-American relationship in the period of the Civil War, a
more developed understanding of foreign policy and interests stems from thorough
analysis. The British perspective of the conflict is not defined solely by official
diplomatic engagement between themselves and American envoys. Public attitudes
factored into the engagement of American agents, both official and unofficial. Attempts
to sway the British public, through propaganda and other avenues of influence, reveal
perceptions of national opinion. British publications at the time, including widely-read
papers such as the Times of London, similarly convey some of the ideology held by
supporters and readers. Furthermore, the involvement of the Empire did not end with the
resolution of the war in 1865. Outstanding issues from the conflict, as well as new
disputes in its aftermath, continued to affect interests at home and in British territories
abroad. Ramifications of the Civil War’s outcome are seen in the consolidation of the
Canadian territories and in the movement towards social and political reform in the
United Kingdom.
To summarize the structure of the text, the first chapter analyzes diplomatic ties
between Britain and the American belligerents, exploring the course of and responses to
specific incidents and issues between these governments during the war. The second
explores the public response, including perception and attitudes towards the conflict, as
well as efforts to influence it by American and sympathetic British propaganda. The third
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focuses on the lasting impacts of Civil War on the British Empire and Anglo-American
discourse in the conflict’s aftermath.
The goals laid forth for this research were twofold. First, it lays out the
importance of diplomatic development throughout the Civil War to its outcome. The
Anglo-American relationship in this period presented both problems and opportunity.
Britain’s role in European affairs heightened its importance to wartime foreign policy, its
influence with contemporaries such as France bringing it to the forefront of this area of
Civil War history. Through analysis of the war’s impact upon foreign policy during and
after the conflict, how these events fit into the context of Civil War history and
international affairs is made clear. The resulting interpretation forms an historical
narrative, to be applied for the second goal.
Second, the project includes the interpretation of information, analyses and
conclusions for public use, in the form of designed websites. In terms of easily-accessible
resources that address this sub-area of Civil War history, there are few that contain a
significant level of detail. Online information and relevant materials are widely dispersed
across different collections and digital libraries. A condensed, detailed resource, one with
an aim to generate interest in the subject, is therefore of use.1 The narratives conveyed
through the constructed web locations tell the story of the Civil War from a different
perspective, highlighting the major issues, events and figures involved in American and
British foreign policy. In effect, the design of these locations act as online exhibits,

1

The two distinct, yet connected websites created to convey this research are, for the purposes
of accessibility in this project, johnathanseitz.com, for a general collections-style site, and
johnathanseitz.com/blog/, focused on narrative analysis and conclusions.
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utilizing imagery and document based material to supplement and convey necessary
information.
Altogether, this work builds upon the research of the past century. Since the late
19th century, the matter of Britain and the Civil War has been analyzed from different
perspectives. Among Civil War historians, a general consensus reached on the nature of
the British view – that idea of ambivalence or apathy towards the entire event.
Concerning modern narratives of the Civil War, multiple authors have noted the lack of
detail previously afforded these subjects. Writing on the role of President Lincoln,
Howard Jones notes that in the “rich historiography” of the period, “most accounts dwell
on battles and personalities,” rather than the “pivotal role of foreign affairs.”2 In historical
memory, the important role of diplomacy in the Civil War is overshadowed by that of
events closer to home, for both the United States and United Kingdom. Thomas Sebrell,
writing on the use of propaganda, believed coverage of “the European factor” in this
conflict of the 1860s, particularly the impact of foreign aid and intervention, falls short of
what is received in “accounts of the War of Independence.”3 Before the development of
closer relations between the two in the 20th century, Anglo-American relations in the
mid-19th century contain a narrative important to the development of both powers. By
giving this subject a greater public presence, it broadens understandings of how events
commonly perceived as isolated in actuality had far-reaching effects.
Since the late 20th century, studies of the subject have gradually been coming to
light, building upon the work of earlier authors. Analysis of the foreign policy decisions
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Howard Jones, Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom: The Union and Slavery in the
Diplomacy of the Civil War, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 2.
3
Thomas E. Sebrell, Persuading John Bull: Union and Confederate Propaganda in Britain, 1860–
65, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), 2.
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made by American leadership or the characteristics of foreign opinion are among the
common approaches taken by authors today. In doing so, they expand on prior coverage
and understanding. For example, author Dean Mahin’s 1999 work, One War at a Time,
explores the role of President Lincoln in defining the U.S. approach to diplomacy,
detailing a level of participation in foreign policymaking greater than previously
suggested.4 As such activity was not at the forefront of the 16th president’s image during
his time in office, occurring out of the public eye or carried out by Secretary Seward,
Lincoln’s presence in those affairs shrank in historical memory.
At the same time, interpretation of the British perspective has evolved from the
early 20th century as well. Where before the early 20th century consensus anchored upon
the idea that views of the war aligned strictly along lines of social and cultural difference,
differing models have developed in modern historiography. Authors like Duncan
Campbell have argued for broadening examinations of Anglo-American relations in the
1850s and 60s, analyzing “each country’s national experience.”5 As such, new
approaches to understanding the British perception of the Civil War balance
generalization with greater analysis of exceptions to the norm.
The American Civil War represents a defining period for the United States, in
more ways than one. A test of the nation’s founding democratic principles, the impact of
the conflict rippled across the Atlantic World. It was not restricted to the continental
United States, to the military campaigning of the North and South. Even as the Union and
Confederacy fought, foreign powers observed, weighing the impact of the crisis upon
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Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War,
(Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), ix.
5
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Brewer, Royal Historical Society, 2003), 12.
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their own interests. For Britain, in the midst of its own continued rise as a world power in
the 19th century, the instability in the United States carried multiple meanings. It was both
distraction and inconvenience, security interests in North America drawing resources
away from matters in Europe and economic growth disrupted by trade impediments. For
some in Britain, the conflict served as an opportunity and inspiration, the course of the
war factoring into the work of reformist causes. The ties of trade and diplomacy
established between the two nations over the course of the 19th century, regardless of
periods of animosity or distrust, left the Empire with vested interests in the Civil War. As
such, analysis of the diplomatic processes occurring behind the scenes rise to greater
importance, for their outcome carried the potential to alter the course of the war.
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CHAPTER 1
The battles of the Civil War were not confined to politics and campaigns of the
Union and Confederate armies in the North and South. Nor were they limited to the
military engagements of Northern and Southern navies in the Atlantic and abroad. At
several points during its course, the Civil War threatened to escalate into a greater
conflict, one that the North could not afford and that the Confederacy hoped could assure
victory. While the chief nature of the conflict was domestic, the American Civil War
nevertheless contains an important, if smaller, international element. The conflict serves
as a backdrop to key moments of American diplomacy in the later 19th century, despite
occurring almost entirely on American soil. Where weapons could not achieve definitive
victories or advantages, words were utilized instead. Diplomacy, whether to achieve
support in the war or to undermine the work of their opponent, was heavily employed.
Agents of the American combatants, both official and unofficial in their roles, operated in
government halls throughout Europe, with the central focus placed upon the British
Empire.
Foreign involvement, whatever form it took, held the potential to sway the course
of the war, for better or for worse, for both the Union and Confederacy. Aid could be
delivered to the ill-supplied Confederacy, foreign powers could offer recognition of its
independent status as legitimate. More immediately, such an achievement could result in
the placement of external economic, diplomatic, or even military pressures upon the
North to end its blockade of the South. While the blockade remained intact, European
nations refusing to undermine it, the economic lifelines of the South likewise remained
cut off. The Lincoln administration recognized the dangers that foreign entry into the war
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would pose to the Union, from limiting its ability to effectively wage multiple wars to the
potential for economic hardship further damaging public support for continuing the fight.
Britain thus received the greatest attention, being the premier global power through its
growing Empire and long-dominant navy. Moreover, the island kingdom had maintained
vested interests in the United States - political, historical, and economic in nature – that
shaped their government’s responses to the American situation.
This section focuses on the interactions between American officials and
diplomats, and their British counterparts, addressing the key themes and issues of Civil
War diplomacy at the governmental level. The central aims of Union and Confederate
agents abroad, particularly within Great Britain are key to understanding their actions and
arguments, and are thus first examined. Following that, the British government’s
perspectives on the conflict at the start of the war, and its varied interests regarding the
United States and the outcome of the conflict are analyzed. For each entity here,
important figures in their diplomatic outreach - not only State Department or Foreign
Ministry leaders, but executives like Lincoln and Palmerston - are included.
The effects of three central issues in shaping the Anglo-American relationship
during the war are then presented, outlining their impact upon official British responses
and the positions taken by the North and South. The first is the fallout of the Trent Affair,
which developed from mid-November of 1861 through into January of 1862, and brought
the Union and Britain closest to another war. The second concerns the case of the CSS
Alabama and other Confederate vessels, examining reaction to their construction in
British shipyards and to attacks on Union ships. Last, the issue of American slavery was a
constant influence upon diplomatic discussion, and the eventual move towards

10

emancipation by Lincoln and the Union had its own consequences in shaping official
views of the Civil War. Each of these issues is central to any narrative interpreting this
field, and work together to place the events and themes of the conflict in an international
context.
At the onset of the Civil War, the United States had the apparent advantage in
most comparisons with the Confederacy. Just in terms of population and industrial
capacity alone, it outmatched the latter significantly. To many onlookers, the effort to
restore the Union was the North’s war to lose. Concerning foreign connections, it had the
benefit of established diplomatic ties with other nations, despite its historic apathy
towards the affairs of the European powers. The United States was not yet a major power
in the world, and its greatest value to the international community derived from its
economic qualities, as an expanding industrialized producer and as an ever-growing
consumer of foreign goods. However, this status did not remove obstacles from the path
of the U.S.’s wartime diplomacy.
On the international stage, President Lincoln’s diplomatic stature was not
established, facing domestic pressures and foreign doubts of his capability as he entered
into office. Past analyses of Lincoln’s role in the Union’s diplomacy have pointed out his
influence upon the messages conveyed by those in the State Department, and his own
image in presenting the Union to foreign observers. Mahin identifies the president’s
personal interests in British law and politics, useful towards understanding, and
defending against, British positions in consecutive diplomatic standoffs during the war.6
Lincoln did not entirely take the backseat to the diplomatic affairs of the nation, as
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responsibilities of the office required direction and input, though concern over the course
of the war and the restoration of the Union undoubtedly drew the bulk of his attention.
The president remained the face of the Union to the general public abroad, with
numerous caricatures and cartoons criticizing or satirizing not only his role in the
American conflict, but his appearance and supposed inexperience. In truth, Lincoln was
involved in significant decision making on matters of foreign policy, working to form
responses he believed appropriate to issues such as the Trent Affair of 1861.
Leading the North’s diplomatic effort was Secretary of State William Seward,
former political opponent of Lincoln and a man with a mixed reputation regarding his
combativeness in the position. Seward thus bore the brunt of foreign officials’ immediate
attentions regarding Union actions and diplomatic positions, with the president’s own
direct involvement in the field lessened as a result. The secretary understood the
imminent dangers of Southern recognition and worked tirelessly to put the interests of the
Union first, unafraid to ‘privately’ make the threat of war to pressure Britain and others,
though knowing when to avoid it. Of course, Seward, like the president, was not without
critics of his performance at home, particularly concerning his handling of controversies
with Britain. In an 1863 letter to Lincoln, Ohio politician Thomas Ewing expressed
dissatisfaction with Seward over the Trent Affair of late 1861. Believing that while the
decision to release captured Confederate diplomats had been the correct course, it had
taken too long to reach, in part due to Seward’s aggressive nature and attitude towards
Britain.7 Seward’s stubbornness concerning his positions on the actions of neutral
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Thomas Ewing, “Letter from Thomas Ewing to Abraham Lincoln, August 17, 1863,” Library of
Congress, Abraham Lincoln papers: Series 1. General Correspondence, Online at
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powers, in Ewing’s view, threatened destabilization of a peaceful resolution. Whether
Northern diplomacy would have proven more effective without Seward at the helm is a
matter of debate, but the Secretary was committed to achieving the aims of the State
Department concerning potential interference and Southern recognition.
In acknowledging the potential threat that British aid or worse, intervention,
would pose to the war effort, Seward and rest of the State Department ardently worked to
prevent such a possibility from occurring. Following the outbreak of war in April, 1861,
the official American diplomatic presence in London was headed by Charles Francis
Adams, Sr., son of John Quincy Adams. The overall aim of his mission in Great Britain,
and the fears if he should fail, are laid out in correspondences from Seward included with
Lincoln’s message to Congress that year. The Secretary’s missive reads:
The agitators in this bad enterprise, justly estimating the influence of the
European powers upon even American affairs, do not mistake in supposing that it
would derive signal advantage from a recognition by any of those powers, and
especially Great Britain. Your task, therefore, apparently so simple and easy,
involves the responsibility of preventing the commission of an act by the
government of that country which would be fraught with disaster, perhaps ruin, to
our own.8
While in England, Adams would be a regular participant in the dialogues between the
North and the British – an individual key towards the easing of any tensions that arose,
with or without direct guidance from Seward in Washington. In this active role, Adams
conveyed to Seward and Lincoln his insight into the affairs of the Palmerston
government, especially the attitudes of key British officials, such as the Foreign Minister
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United States Department of State. Message of the President of the United States to the Two
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Earl Russell. But even with Adams’s presence, the Union effort was not without
challenges.
It must be noted that, with the splintering of the Union and the ensuing military
conflict, the Lincoln Administration was weakened in its ability to address events in other
parts of the New World. The disruption caused by the Secession Crisis, and the potential
permanency of this secession at the start of the war was a great danger to the cause of the
Union abroad, seen as a failure of the American republican system. As Jones notes, the
divisions that arose were “exposing the myriad weaknesses of a popular government now
collapsing in anarchy” to the governments of Europe.9 The inability of the Union to
restore itself, to quickly quash the Southern rebellion, was further evidence towards this.
The drawing out of the war, and the military stalemates of the first two years, were a
significant detractor to the Union cause abroad. The view of former Confederate agent
Edwin De Leon, written after the war, provides a summary of this point, and though his
personal biases should be considered, he does make reference to European reactions to
accounts of the Union’s embarrassing defeat at First Bull Run. Judging the impact of the
words of Times journalist William Howard Russell and others, the agent holds the view
that such reports reinforced a view that the two sides were more of a match for each
other, at least at the start of the war.10 However, the Confederacy’s ability to turn back
early Union advances would not endure. By 1863, strings of Northern military successes
placed further pressure on the South, undermining arguments of military equivalency.
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Howard Jones, Blue & Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations,
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 2.
10
Edwin De Leon, Secret History of Confederate Diplomacy Abroad, Edited by William C. Davis,
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 30.
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The lapse in U.S. attention to the rest of the hemisphere opened the way for the
nations of Europe to act on opportunities in Latin America, the situation preventing
enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine issued decades prior. The primary case for such a
‘violation’ would be the European actions against Mexico, concurrent to the events of the
Civil War. Mahin notes that, for France and the other powers involved in the invasion of
Mexico, the transformation into a puppet state was justified “as a means of thwarting the
ultimate domination or absorption” of that nation by the U.S.11 Some prominent British
officials, for their part, saw the breaking of the Union and the potential diminishment of
American power through their own disunity in a similar light. The words of one war
observer, Field Marshal Viscount Garnet Wolseley, expressed the view that a broken
Union was necessary to continued British power. On the conflict, the Marshal writes:
Every person that reflects on the matter must be aware that it is in the interest of
all nations, but especially of England, to have more than one great republic upon
the American continent, as they were fast becoming such a nuisance in the
republic of nations that if by any accident they should succeed in their war of
subjugation, their insolence and arrogance would be more intolerable than ever.12
In arguments of this nature, notable British figures like Wolseley gave credence to
Northern fears that sympathies for the South permeated Britain’s upper classes. That such
ideologies influenced the decisions of Parliament or worse, were expressed within the
Palmerston government itself, would be a regular public concern in early diplomatic
confrontations.
As a newly formed entity, the Confederate States of America lacked preexistent
official diplomatic relations with other countries. Its international ties were

11

Mahin, One War at a Time, 220.
Garnet Wolseley, The American Civil War: An English View: The Writings of Field Marshal
Viscount Wolseley, ed. James Rawley, (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2002), 41-42.
12

15

predominantly economic, like those of the North, though rooted to its agrarian status as
the leading region of the world in cotton production. To better match the organization of
the Union in diplomatic capability, the Davis administration rapidly worked to build a
State Department that could compete with its Northern counterpart. Despite changes in
leadership over the course of the war, the overall aims of Confederate diplomacy abroad,
once determined, remained the same. Most central was the goal of recognition of its
independent status by the powers of Europe. Through that, the introduction of either aid
or outside arbitration in its conflict with the remaining United States would give the
South several avenues towards greater influence and autonomy, either in a reunited U.S.
or through two American nations. However, the results of their efforts fell significantly
short of the goals they had hoped for.
A challenge to the organization of the Confederate State department during the
war concerns its leadership. Whereas the Union was served by Secretary Seward in this
capacity through to the end of the conflict, and after, the Southern office lacked any such
permanence in its leadership. Peterson notes the challenges faced by the first secretary,
Robert Toombs, who entered office in early 1861 “with no official foreign policy” in
place, something only addressed through a “disorganized and ugly” process.13 Lacking
the resources to support extensive diplomatic operations and at odds with others in the
Confederate government – both within the Congress and President Jefferson Davis –
Toombs resigned his position only months later. Replacing Toombs was Robert Hunter,
who similarly only served roughly half a year in the position, between July, 1861, and the
following February. It was Hunter who oversaw Confederate actions leading into the
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Dennis Peterson, Confederate Cabinet Departments and Secretaries, (Jefferson: McFarland &
Company, Inc., 2016), 211.
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Trent Affair, including the assignment of new waves of diplomatic agents, such as James
Mason and John Slidell, to England and France.
In the same vein as early American diplomatic outreach - envoys sent to foreign
courts and governments perceived as friendly – results were mixed. Neutrality concerns
limited interaction with high-level figures, particularly in England, frustrating the direct
outreach efforts of Southern agents. Hunter, like Toombs, similarly expressed
dissatisfaction with diplomatic work, as well as in the performance of Jefferson Davis
and other Confederate leaders.14 These transitions - and the slowness with which the
South’s foreign policy pieced itself together - served to dull the diplomatic impact of their
early military victories. Despite repeated attempts to pressure foreign powers, the absence
of effective messaging beyond the first year of war, after which it increasingly turned
against the Confederacy, helped seal its fate.
The last Secretary of State to serve the Confederacy oversaw the office the
longest. From mid-1862 through to the end of the war, former Secretary of War Judah P.
Benjamin held the reins of Confederate diplomacy. Unlike his predecessors, there was
more trust between him and Davis, and the secretary was able to expand Confederate
diplomatic operations to other nations of Europe.15 However, Benjamin also operated in
the time frame that saw the accelerating decline of Southern hopes, both in military
victory and in foreign intervention. The secretary was responsible for proposing to
President Davis a radical last ditch effort to win foreign support in 1864, convincing him
to support the move. In exchange for recognition and aid, the South would move towards
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the emancipation of its slaves and slash the cost of its cotton product.16 This plan too,
would fail, as it came too late in the conflict to convince Europe to delay what was
inevitable. The South’s failings in other aspects of the war had cut off any chance of
overt support.
A persistent theme associated with early Southern diplomatic outreach, and one
that is most often associated with this field of the Civil War as a whole, revolved around
the concepts of ‘King Cotton Diplomacy.’ The idea - that ‘Cotton is King’ - preceded the
war, stemming from the plant’s cash crop nature and prominent influence in Atlantic
trade. Nothing could compete with the dominance of cotton, and any war made upon the
South - endangering the supply of cotton, would fail due to the dependency of Europe
upon the region’s productivity. Argued in 1858 by South Carolina Senator James
Hammond, the view held that South would remain economically sound under threat,
while “England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her.”17 A
strategy heavily promoted at the start of the war, particularly by Secretaries Toombs and
Hunter, it did not achieve the desired result, and repeated failure to achieve results served
to further limit the South’s economic sway in the Atlantic world.18 Diplomatic leverage
of Southern cotton failed to make as much of an impact largely due to stockpiles of the
product kept across Europe. Built up in the UK as a result of exports from previous years,
not only was Southern cotton drawn upon, but product from colonial sources in Egypt
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and India were utilized as well.19 Thus, although economic pressures gradually grew in
Europe amid later shortages, the immediate impact was dulled. The Confederacy,
however, were victims of their own earlier prosperity, and repeated attempts to further
this strategy in early diplomacy only impeded the delivery of other, potentially more
successful arguments from Southern officials.
In response to early declarations of neutrality by Davis and leading Confederates,
the Southern public pushed to cut off its cotton exports – effectively an embargo to
pressure outside intervention. Southerners, some acting on their own accord, blocked
shipments, denying foreign textile factories material essential to production. This move,
however, had consequences beyond what the Confederacy had first anticipated. The
implementation of the Union blockade from late 1861 onwards worsened their own
economic situation, as there was no way to sell cotton sitting in Southern ports had they
wanted. Furthermore, by 1862, it was increasingly clear that depriving Britain of
Southern cotton was not having the desired effect upon diplomatic efforts. Charles
Adams wrote to Seward of the Confederates’ folly and their turn to other attempts, noting
a large stockpile of cotton that continued to supply British factories.20 Southerners in the
public and the government continued to support the idea, even after its immediate
impacts had been dulled significantly, but it remained a faint hope – unable to change the
minds of European leaders.
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Like the North, the Southern government faced challenges in working to achieve
its goals, including the issues regarding cotton above and questions regarding the
continued practice of slavery, to be discussed later. Unlike the North, the South faced
factors that impeded success in diplomatic outreach. The issue of military performance
factored into foreign views of the South just as it factored into views of its opponent.
Early victories that carried the war past 1861 gave agents abroad evidence to argue the
South could hold its own, that it merited foreign support. However, persistent issues
undermined and degraded this position. The most direct evidence is the shift in the course
of the war between 1862 and 1863.
While the South inflicted heavy blows to Northern forces in Virginia amid the
campaigns against Richmond and other targets, winning victories at Fredericksburg in
December, and at Chancellorsville in the spring of 1863, the Union gradually gained a
clear upper-hand. The continued impediment of the blockade upon the South, which,
despite repeated efforts, remained unbroken through the war, was a significant factor in
the reluctance of Britain to involve itself. Concerning this issue, Southern diplomat De
Leon recounts a conversation with Prime Minister Palmerston in 1862. The agent
encountered questions over the inability of the South to overcome the blockade, thereby
proving its ability to the outside world in the process.21 The failure of the Confederacy to
relieve themselves of the blockade by the time the war turned against them only
heightened the need for foreign aid. The South, while at first successful in deflecting the
Northern advance, did not have the resources nor the trade access necessary to compete
with its opponent indefinitely.
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Turning to the British stance itself, while largely focused upon the affairs of
Europe and its Empire over the course of the early 19th century, events in America
maintained the attentions of the public and Parliament. In the 1850s, the leadership of the
British Empire was not unaware of the devolving situation between the factions of the
United States. Henry John Temple, the Viscount Palmerston, served as Prime Minister in
Liberal-controlled government, though on most matters relating to diplomacy, the
Foreign Minister, John Russell, had some autonomy.22 Effectively, their situation
regarding foreign policy was alike to that of Lincoln and Seward. Both men leaned
towards neutrality, as did the British minister to the U.S., Lord Lyons. However, it should
be noted that word of Palmerston’s satisfaction concerning the fracturing – stemming
from prior standoffs - played to Northern suspicions that he favored the South early on.23
Regardless of their personal views on the United States, the Secession Crisis, and the
implications it had for the future of American power in North America, had presented a
tense situation for Britain to navigate. Foreman notes that, despite the divisions between
his own councils, “the imperative to stay out of America’s troubles was one of the few
issues that united Palmerston’s fractious cabinet,” particularly at this early stage.24
Reactions to the election of 1860 were concerning, though not unforeseen, given
Southern grumblings for years. However, when an imminent war on the other side of the
Atlantic was visible on the horizon, maintaining Britain’s neutrality became more
difficult to achieve.
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The official position of the British government was announced by Queen Victoria
in May, 1861, to be further defined by Earl Russell in his work as Foreign Minister later
on. The initial proclamation laid out the rights of Britain as a neutral entity in the conflict,
at the same time recognizing the belligerent statuses of both Union and Confederacy, and
finally prohibiting, or warning against, British citizens aiding or participating in the
conflict.25 Amongst other actions, the discussion of belligerency meant opening the door
to Southern trade, though it would later also lead to the acceptance of the Union’s right of
blockade. Russell’s additions to British neutrality broadened its scope going into 1862,
with one set of rules affecting territorial waters around England and the territories.
Directed at privateers and ships-of-war – aligning with either of the belligerents – these
stipulations barred port access in English waters, and limited the supplies such vessels
could replenish to non-military items and provisions.26 The provisions of equal treatment
as belligerents angered the Union and gave hope to the Confederacy that further progress
could be made to stronger ties with Britain. More importantly, however, were the
regulations concerning maritime law and the rights, expectations, and limitations of
neutral and belligerent powers. For the British Empire, these positions which would be
challenged during the war - legal debate arising out of the Trent controversy of late 1861,
as well as the careers of multiple British built Confederate commerce raiders, including
the Alabama.
Of course, there were economic factors at play as well for the British government,
not merely its political interests in the conflict erupting on the other side of the Atlantic.
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Having heavily industrialized over the course of the late 18th and early 19th century,
England served as the manufacturing hub of Europe and one of the dominant industrial
producers in the global economy. This status left it with strong ties to both sides of the
Civil War, with the potential for economic consequences developing depending on the
conflict’s outcome and Britain’s role towards it. Chief among its various growing
industries was textile goods manufacturing - spread throughout the nation, but
concentrated in centers such as Manchester in Lancashire. This production had driven
industrial growth, and growing demand necessitated bulk supplies, forming this link
between Britain and the South.
But the reasons for the failure of the South’s cotton diplomacy with the Empire
are several fold. First, the South was a victim of its own making, cotton overproduction
driving surpluses of the crop. As noted earlier, Britain had a built up stockpile of cotton
from before the war, primarily from imports from just before the war.27 While there were
occasional ‘famines’ of cotton, the reserve materials provided a buffer for the textile
industry, thereby undercutting the impact of cotton diplomacy in the first years of war. As
to why such outreach failed to convince Britain to intervene after this, the latter nation
began drawing on textile resources from other sources. Despite their access to the South’s
higher quality cotton being cut off, by the blockade and the actions of the South itself in
its informal embargo, Britain had looked towards possible substitutions. As earlier noted,
these they found to the East, in the Empire’s territories in the Egypt and India. An 1861
Punch cartoon, titled “Over the Way” reflects the shift in British cotton interests towards
open markets, as the American one grew mired in unpredictability, displaying John Bull
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turning elsewhere.28 The importance of cotton to diplomacy between Britain and the
South diminished over the course of the war, outweighed by other factors in the nation’s
interest.
The British economic interest in the Union was more varied, posing a greater
problem for the British to overcome were their relationship to deteriorate. Prior to the
war, the U.S. had begun work to pass a protectionist tariff on manufactured goods, which,
when finally passed in February, 1861 – hit imports from Great Britain hard.29 Known as
the Morrill Tariff, though it preceded the Lincoln administration the damage it did to the
U.S.’s British relations started their diplomatic outreach on a sour note. However, the
Union retained its own advantage concerning the agricultural consumption of England.
While the North did not produce cotton, what its agricultural regions did grow was just as
important as the cotton supply both prior to and during the war. Because of its size, the
Union had the space to grow significant quantities of grains – wheat in particular, as well
as a variety of other foodstuffs. While the South was itself large in terms of territory, its
farmlands were increasingly devoted to cotton and other cash crops. Cited by Mahin,
Jordan and Pratt noted that British importation of such products from the U.S. had grown
exponentially, a supply that Russell and others recognized could be cut off.30 The loss of
Union resources vital to feeding the public – in the case of Southern Recognition or a
separate deterioration of relations – consistently would play into the talks between the
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two nations. Thus, while the importance of Southern quality cotton faded – cut off and
replaced by other regions – the North’s food exports remained a key contributor to
supporting the needs of the British population.
Diplomatic ties between Americans and the British were shaped by the events of
the war, influencing relations between the two for years after the conflict’s end. As the
Union and Confederacy organized their respective diplomatic messaging and officials,
the first key moments of the Civil War’s international side began to play out. The events
of 1861 through 1863, the opening years of the war, are crucial to understanding both
American and international perspectives of diplomatic relations at this time. Furthermore,
they play a role in the shaping of later Anglo-American ties. For the Confederates, their
hope for foreign recognition, or even just economic aid in the form of open trade, lay in
outreach towards England and France. It was to these nations that the first of its agents
and diplomats would travel. The Union, seeking to prevent the South from making
headway on foreign recognition or support, worked to counter or block these actions.
With the military standoffs and stalemates throughout the campaigns at home, both sides
of the conflict recognized the importance of outside influences in the hopes of the other, a
mutual understanding that brought about the most contentious periods in the war. Not
between North and South, but between the former and England.
On November 7th, 1861, half a year after the attack on Fort Sumter, an English
mail carrier, the RMS Trent left Havana on a standard delivery voyage returning to the
United Kingdom. Aboard the vessel, alongside its other passengers and crew, were a
team of Confederate diplomats – James M. Mason and John Slidell, accompanied by
aides and family. Their presence outside the Confederacy was not hidden from the Union,
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as they had previously run the Union blockade, avoiding capture then. Their
government’s state department, then under Robert M.T. Hunter, had assigned them their
mission as official envoys to Europe. There, they were to make appeals on behalf of the
Southern cause - Mason operating largely in England and Slidell in France. As their
arrival was publicized around the Caribbean, their movement and destinations were not
kept secret, being known in Havana. The fact that the captain of the Trent had them
aboard, despite the prevalence of this information, would become a focal point of
arguments over the legality of actions taken, a defense put forth by Seward and others.31
On the 8th, the Trent was intercepted by a Union warship, the USS San Jacinto, its
captain - Charles Wilkes – operating with the view that capturing Mason and Slidell was
legal, as they were transported as ‘contraband’ of war. Despite being a neutral vessel,
Wilkes had the vessel boarded. After a search, Trent’s diplomatic passengers were
removed and placed under arrest, only after which the mail carrier was permitted to
continue its journey.
The capture of the Confederate diplomats ignited a firestorm of debate on both
sides of the Atlantic, fueling both anger and concern. The Lincoln administration was
now in a difficult situation, though at first most – the president and Seward included –
applauded Wilkes’s actions.32 The North had greeted the arrests as a much-needed
victory, though new waves of anti-British sentiment emerged. Moreover, a defense was
still needed as questions and demands concerning the seizure would inevitably arrive.
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Secretary Seward, writes of the arrests on the 30th of November in an update to Charles
Francis Adams, establishing the defense that Captain Wilkes had acted without direct
orders to do so. In writing that the U.S. would be “therefore free from the embarrassment
which might have resulted if the act had been specially directed by us,” Seward hoped to
deflect attacks and dampen the British response ahead of escalation.33 Despite this
disconnect between the actions of the San Jacinto and the government, the actions of
Wilkes were quickly seen by British officials as disregarding the rights of neutral powers,
an act of great disrespect to their nation.
Days after news reached England, Foreign Minister John Russell expressed these
sentiments in a letter to Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador to the United States.
Characterizing the incident as “an act of violence which was an affront to the British flag
and a violation of international law,” Russell expressed concern over the course of the
Affair, directing the ambassador to take Britain’s grievances to Secretary Seward.34
Amends could only be made through a thorough explanation and the release of the
captured envoys. Though he recognized the likelihood of Wilkes acting on his own
volition, the letter nonetheless conveys Russell’s desire for clarity on the U.S. position
and steps taken by his counterpart towards an apology.
These letters reflect the themes of the back-and-forth that followed the Affair
between late November and into January the following year, past its official resolution.
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They convey the tensions of the dialogue between British and American officials on
either side of the Atlantic, as the speed of discourse was slow and neither side was
willing to back down against perceived transgressions by the other. On the sidelines of all
this, despite the arrest of its main envoys, Confederate leadership saw the course of
events as an unforeseen benefit, sowing ill feeling between Britain and their adversary.
Their hope, naturally, was that the situation would escalate into another war, or at least an
avenue towards securing greater British sympathy and aid for the South, a gamble
perceived as a last, desperate fling of the dice to some in the Union.35 Tensions rose, but
war remained off the table for the moment.
Calls for a reprisal, escalating to declarations of war, appeared throughout
sympathetic media and public circles in the North and in Britain, pressuring officials in
both governments to act. Thurlow Weed, an American politician - and agent for Seward in London, conveyed his concerns over this feeling and its effect, writing on December
7th:
Nothing but “War, and rumors of War,” are heard here. All expect, and all accept
it, and generally with less reluctance than I anticipated. It is unfortunately, assumed that
we are unfriendly to England, and are seeking a quarrel. The causes of our own War are
wholly misunderstood. While we were attending to our own business, Confederate
emissaries were in Europe perverting the judgements and poisoning the minds of
Governments and People.36
The agent goes on to elaborate on the potential actions and preemptive measures
undertaken by England, suggesting that were there a lack of ice in the St. Lawrence,
“British War Steamers would soon be in the Great Lakes.37 Weed’s dire predictions were
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not far off the mark. Among the British responses to the perceived slight by the Union
was the formation of a war council, made up of leading figures including Lord
Palmerston and Earl Russell. Jones notes the steps taken for preparation against a
possible American invasion, as had been attempted decades earlier, including additional
troops and naval support.38 The Empire’s concerns over the safety of its Canadian
territories, a reasonable course as they had become a target of the Northern public’s
frustrations after Trent, escalated an already tense situation. Neither side was yet willing
to back down from its position on the Affair.
Despite the precautions taken by Britain, a secondary war with the Empire was
the last thing that President Lincoln wanted. However, public opinion still favored
keeping the diplomats in captivity, and Lincoln himself was reluctant to set them free.39
Views on the matter clashed within the administration, and the White House received
letters arguing for different approaches – to refuse, to acquiesce, or to delay. Former
President Fillmore wrote to Lincoln that “the last hope of restoring the Union will
vanish,” a “dishonorable peace” would be forced in the face of another war, suggesting
outside European arbitration to ease the situation.40 This sentiment was echoed by
Wisconsin Senator James Doolittle, who suggested coming together to determine “with
greater certainty the rights of belligerents against neutrals upon the High Seas and in
which constitutes contraband of war.”41 Later in life, Charles Francis Adams Jr., son of
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the ambassador, drew upon his father’s thoughts on the Affair and put to words one of the
arguments that had defended Wilkes’s actions. He notes that in carrying the Confederate
diplomats - individuals recognized as belligerents under Victoria’s decree – the Trent
“was in plain violation both of recognized British principles and precedents regulating the
obligations of neutrals,” as well as “the Queen’s proclamation.”42 These differing
arguments concerning the U.S.’s response to Russell’s demands drew out the crisis, and
left the British questioning the American position.
Public debate on war continued to frame talks between American and British
emissaries into December. Agents such as Weed held the view that British leadership,
while wanting to avoid conflict, were aware “that a war over the Trent issue, gives them
the support of the whole Nation.”43 At the same time however, figures such as Russell
had their own doubts about the extent of such support in their country, even questioning
the strength of the British legal case against the Union, should the issue move into outside
arbitration. Prior British actions, going back to the War of 1812, were examined for any
applicable precedents concerning doctrines of naval law.44 This search for precedent, a
course mirrored across the Atlantic in Union justifications for the legality of Trent, set the
stage for further discussion of neutral rights and maritime law in the post-Civil War era.
In the end, despite public and governmental pressure toward keeping Mason,
Slidell and the other diplomats in Union custody, the Lincoln administration gave way to
the British position. Following an ultimatum from Russell in mid-December, Lincoln was
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convinced that drawing out the issue further proved a greater risk than it was worth. As
Jones notes, “War with England over debatable legal principles was too high a price to
pay for refusing to release the captives.”45 The men were allowed to go free and be
transported to Europe in late December, as Russell had first demanded, though the U.S.
did not extend a formal apology for the actions of Captain Wilkes. Minister Adams
would write to his son the following February, describing the Affair as having “proved
thus far somewhat in the nature of a sharp thunderstorm which has burst without doing
any harm.”46 Adams considered the situation resolved in such manner that allowed both
Great Britain and the United States to save face and move on. The perceived violation of
British neutrality had been amended, and while anger persisted, the threat of war had
been neutralized
Ultimately the only entity that came out of Trent in a diplomatic loss was the
South. The Affair had not escalated into a greater standoff between the two powers as
Confederates had hoped. England had not entered the war and remained reluctant to do so
on their behalf. Nor did it make any further moves towards their recognition as an
independent power, which would have opened the door for other nations, such as France,
to do so as well. While its captured diplomats could finally travel to Europe and begin
operating in their assigned posts, the Confederacy, in the end, had gained little of what it
desired. An image published in 1862, titled ‘The Great Surrender’ captures some of the
feelings of both sides concerning the result. It portrays the release of Mason and Slidell as
a surrender on the part of Seward despite John Russell’s disregard for the right of search,

45

Jones, Blue & Gray Diplomacy, 109.
Charles Francis Adams, Sr., “Letter from Charles Francis Adams, Sr. to Charles Francis Adams,
Jr., February 21, 1862,” Online at https://cwld.alexanderstreet.com/philologic/CWLD/navigate/25798/1/.
46

31

yet it also notes Confederate President Jefferson Davis’s displeasure at being deprived of
an open conflict between Britain and the North.47 The Confederacy would look for other
means of undermining these diplomatic ties, though the situation would not deteriorate to
this point again.
A further development out of Trent was the redoubling of Union efforts to ease
tensions with the British Empire, contributing to the latter’s continued official
impartiality in the conflict. The Lincoln administration, through Secretary Seward,
utilized the Trent resolution as a stepping stone to foster further cooperation on issues
outside the affairs of the war. Prominent among these was the crackdown upon the slave
trade in the Atlantic Ocean, a lingering issue where earlier negotiations had made limited
progress. The product of these efforts followed not long after the immediate issues
surrounding Trent had been resolved, in an agreement reached in the spring of 1862. The
Lyons-Seward Treaty, aimed at the suppression of the slave trade, allowed both nations
the power of search regarding each other’s merchant vessels on suspicion of participating
in the practice.48 While not addressing the conflict ongoing in America, Seward’s work in
crafting the treaty with Lord Lyons was a step towards mending the divide between their
nations. However, three years of war remained, bringing with them new challenges and
questions for Anglo-American relations.
Despite progress, while some of the tension caused by the events of the Trent
Affair had been mended by late 1862, other issues, coincidentally also maritime in nature,
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soon emerged that again raised questions on the parameters of British neutrality. While
not implemented in full, a key part of an initial proposal for Union strategy, the
Anaconda Plan, called for a blockade of Confederate ports, strangling their flow of
commerce. Lacking a navy that could rival the North’s, the few ships of war the South
had, as well as its trade vessels, were constrained to coastal ventures and their home
ports. Their available resources left transit and trade through the blockade limited to
small blockade runners and whatever could be smuggled out of the South. Constant
economic pressures and the demands of the war effort necessitated a way to break up or
circumvent the blockade. Limited resources and time meant that it could not solely rely
upon the production of its own shipyards – the Confederacy had to turn elsewhere.
To try and close the gap between their own naval power and that of the Union, to
strengthen their attempts to break the blockades in the Atlantic and Gulf, the Southern
government looked past the Union ships. While European nations remained neutral, there
were methods through which it could acquire the necessary ships to attempt challenges to
the blockade or to run it. This task was given to agents abroad, both in the service of the
Confederate State Department and the Navy. Minister James Mason aided in the placing
of international orders, but it was agent James D. Bulloch who served most successfully
in this charge within the United Kingdom. Bulloch would work towards the South’s
interests both on his own and in carrying out orders from Naval Secretary Stephen
Mallory, securing funds from interested parties for the construction of ships.49 This would
tie the origins of a segment of the Navy to the shipyards of England and France.

49

Craig Symonds, The Civil War at Sea, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 82.

33

Prominent among them were those at Liverpool and neighboring Birkenhead, as the area
served as a hub of activity for Bulloch and other agents of the Confederate Navy abroad.
However, the entire operation needed an extra level of caution and concealment to
hide the purpose intended for ships awaiting completion. The terms of British neutrality
stood against their construction, ordered by Bulloch or other intermediaries, as such an
act would suggest that Britain was permitting military support to the South. Early cases,
such as that of the Oreto (later the Florida), escaped confiscation through the argument
that they were not fitted as ships of war – at least not in British waters.50 Despite Union
protests, such vessels were permitted to leave, usually sailing disguised under a British
flag and crew. They would travel elsewhere – often to the Caribbean or the Azores – to
be refitted depending on their military function. Some would then run the blockade to
join the Confederate fleet directly, while others operated outside the Union line, hunting
weaker targets at sea. These ships, operating as raiders, avoided direct military
engagement with the U.S. Navy, instead targeting U.S. trade vessels around the world.
In late 1862, the Union received reports of attacks on its shipping off New
England, leading to cries of piracy against the Southern perpetrators. The crew in
question sailed the CSS Alabama, a sloop of war and later among the most infamous of
the Confederate ships to sail out of Liverpool. Her two year cruise raised fresh concern
over violations of British neutrality, and the awareness and attitude of the Palmerston
government concerning still ongoing construction. Leaving the shipyard of John Laird &
Sons in late July, 1862, she was concealed under number 290, later the name Enrica,
though her purpose was guessed by the Union. The vessel’s structure clearly signified a
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military purpose, yet it was not fitted with any armaments, meaning its construction
appeared to be under compliance with British laws on neutrality in shipbuilding. This
loophole in British neutrality became a point of criticism from Americans, later
pressuring for legal review by Lord Russell and the British Admiralty in the face of
further shipbuilding.
The Enrica did not escape England without facing the threat of capture, despite
maintaining the appearance of a neutral vessel. Through its own agents, the Union moved
the USS Tuscarora to intercept the vessel when British officials made no move to
intercede.51 Escaping the net to the safety of the Azores, the ship’s officers, including
Captain Raphael Semmes, arrived to oversee her fitting and arming for service. Taking
place off of Terceira Island, the Alabama was commissioned on August 24th, 1862, her
crew was comprised of diverse nationalities, including those that had sailed her as the
Enrica. From there, the ship began a cruise eastward, targeting Union whaling and
merchants vessels. Reports of crews and passengers taken prisoner, and ships plundered
and burned soon raised Northern anger, yet the raider eluded open combat.
Once news of the Alabama’s activities in the Azores and off New England, and
her origins were firmly traced to the shipyards of Liverpool, a fresh wave of anti-British
sentiment swept the North. As a raider, the vessel preyed not upon Union warships, but
on its commerce, stalking and harassing Northern shipping, inflicting financial damage
and spreading fears over the safety of trade. Frustration at British inaction, specifically
the roles of Russell and the Crown’s legal offices, in preventing her departure developed
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alongside this concern. Mersi notes that, on the question of its legality under the Foreign
Enlistment Act, the advice given to the foreign minister by law officials suggested that “if
American allegations were correct, and if their charges could be confirmed,” a temporary
prevention of departure would be warranted.52 Concerning the Alabama, Britain could
not do anything further once the ship left port. Two years later, off Cherbourg, France,
the raider would be sunk in a battle with its pursuer, USS Kearsarge, after a career that
saw millions of dollars in damages done to Union merchants.
The actions of the Alabama and her crew in the Atlantic and elsewhere are only
the most prominent example of British-built vessels, but its construction was not an
isolated incident. Confederate orders for other vessels were conveyed through Bulloch
and Mason, leading to further controversy between the North and Britain between 1862
and 1863. While the Alabama’s infamy was growing abroad, the Laird yards began work
on a pair of new ironclad ships, their order employing the same process as before to mask
construction, identified in Confederate correspondence only as 294 and 295 early on.53
These ‘Laird Rams,’ as they came to be called, were ordered by Bulloch and intended to
be superior to other Confederate ironclads as well as those of the Union.
The controversy over these new ironclads sparked division on both sides of the
Atlantic, raising tensions once more. Within the Lincoln Administration, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox wrote the President condemning perceived
inaction on Adams and Seward’s part for not aggressively pushing Britain to end the
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construction.54 In Britain, facing growing frustration from Minister Adams – who had,
despite Fox’s thoughts, been working to block the rams – Earl Russell was increasingly
facing a legal situation equitable to that of Seward around Trent. With threats of war from
Adams on one side, and a lengthy search for an answer to the legality of potential seizure
on the other, Great Britain was poised for embarrassment, something Foreman notes both
Adams and Seward were aware of in the aftermath of a move by Russell to finally detain
the ships in October, 1863.55 While the ironclads were eventually purchased and
incorporated into the Royal Navy, thereby ending the debate over the Laird Rams, the
construction of additional vessels, walking a thin line of legality, continued.
Further examples accompany the case of Laird’s ironclad rams, showcasing
attempts to evade British neutrality and further action by Britain’s foreign office to crack
down on such activity. Operating out of Glasgow, Confederate agent James H. North
ordered two 150-pound Armstrong guns for the large, ironclad vessel he was overseeing,
though his frustrations in the potential for interference of Minister Adams and Earl
Russell show the risk posed to these projects. Writing to Secretary Mallory, the agent
suggests transferring the ship to a French flag to delay action against it.56 This tactic was
one method of a larger approach to the issue, in which Confederate agents, as private
citizens, placed orders and later transferred ownership of the ships to other entities,
including governments as in the case of the rams. In another case - that of the Alexandra
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built in Liverpool - the vessel was a gift to Bulloch for use in the war and underwent a
year of litigation to determine her fate. Agents regularly commented on the continuing
case of the Alexandra and the potential fallout concerning their own projects should the
vessel be held indefinitely.57 Though the Alexandra was eventually allowed to sail - to
later be detained elsewhere under different owners - the resolution to the case did not
sway the course of British action against the work of the agents and associated shipyards.
For the rest of the war, further confiscations or forced sales to prevent seizure severely
limited the ability of the Confederacy to maintain its Navy.
Like the Trent Affair, the impact of the Alabama’s actions and the controversy
over the construction of further vessels by Laird and others together form a key issue
within Anglo-American relations during the period of the War. Furthermore, its effects
persisted for years after the conflict’s end as a catalyst for debate between representatives
of the two nations. These discussions, beginning after the first attacks by the Alabama,
focused upon the claims of the American government on behalf of merchants hit by the
effects of it and other raiders during the war. An 1871 agreement between the U.S. and
Britain – the Treaty of Washington – called for an outside body of neutral powers to
examine the case for compensation.58 Common arguments going into the Grant
administration took into account not only the latter’s earlier lack of action in allowing
these ships to begin their careers of piracy, but their role in blockade running and other
activities argued to have prolonged the war.59 Eventually, a settlement - arbitrated by an
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international tribunal in Geneva - was reached in 1872 awarding over $15 million to the
U.S. as recompense for all losses incurred.60 Despite frustrations within Parliament,
including from the current Prime Minister William Gladstone and Lord Russell, the
British government went through with the payment. In this way the last outstanding
issues of the diplomatic side of the Civil War were resolved, allowing both nations to
move on from those years of tension.
Finally, on the matter of slavery, its role as a central issue behind the war - though
not placed at the forefront until 1863 – consistently influenced the outreach of the
American belligerents. Despite persistent efforts to make inroads within the British
government, Confederate diplomats failed to make any headway that amounted to more
than sympathy. Partly because of the war’s military campaigns turning against the South
beginning in late 1862, European nations, Britain at the forefront, were increasingly
reluctant to become involved in a conflict that appeared headed towards an inevitable
conclusion. But the issues surrounding slavery were a weight that Southern appeals could
not effectively shake. While perhaps not explicitly pro-slavery, economic interests or
other sympathies for the South matched or else, outweighed the convictions of some in
Parliament. For others, their stance remained solid in their view of the South’s actions.
This divide is most prominent when the course of the war was still undetermined, when
the South had a feasible path to victory. However, this does not mean that the
incorporation of abolition as pillar of the Union cause resulted in an absolutely positive
reaction in the Empire. Within Parliament and the offices of the Prime Minister, differing
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British sentiments on slavery clashed, leading to questions for both Confederacy and
Union in their turn.
For British leadership, slavery was not the issue at the forefront of diplomatic
talks with Confederate emissaries such as James Mason. At most, it underlay different
topics of discussion, but the issue is more integrated with the public and propagandized
responses of Britain to the conflict in America. While public opinion on slavery and how
it related to the war shifted over its course, influencing official responses towards the
South’s overtures later on, early concerns related to the aforementioned military and
economic woes of the Confederacy. A last attempt by the Confederacy to win over
support in early 1865, outlined earlier as promising emancipation and cotton for support,
failed for this reason. Hubbard notes that in the case of the Kenner mission’s terms,
slavery had no bearing on recognition, rather “it was the absence of any threat to the vital
interests of the Continental powers” that did so.61 Slavery interests amongst European
leadership had not risen to a point that reflected the growing Confederate view that the
practice had impeded their attempts at recognition.
Nevertheless, the issue does have a small role to play in the shaping of
government sympathies going into the midpoint of the war, into 1863. In the months
following Lincoln’s actions towards emancipation, with the issue moving to the forefront
of the Union cause in the process, British sentiment remained mixed. On the issue,
Dubrulle cites comments made by Earl Russell in a letter to William Gladstone in 1862,
that “a “war of emancipation” would mean “a war of greater destruction.”62 In his view,
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the Civil War in America would be pushed into greater violence with less chance for
peace between North and South. In September the following year, Russell gave a speech
that included discussion of affairs concerning the Confederacy, from the issue of
belligerent rights to British shipbuilding.63 The issue of slavery and his own thoughts –
both personal and as a diplomat – on the institution’s practice in the South are conveyed.
Russell states that while it remains “one of the most horrible crimes that yet disgraces
humanity,” it would be no benefit to Britain or to the world to “have no relations with a
people who permit slavery to exist among them.”64 Ultimately, through this section of his
speech, the foreign minister maintains the necessity of British neutrality in the conflict,
expressing an ambivalent view in pointing out faults in the causes of both combatants and
how the war has been justified.
Britain’s economic ties to the South places its stance on the issue of slavery in an
intriguing light, as this, in part, shapes their views of the institution’s relation to the Civil
War. Supplied by its cotton prior to the war, impediments to British manufacturing were
perceived by Northerners as a driving force behind visible reluctance to confront the
South on slavery. The blockade by the Union was one, while the informal cotton embargo
by the South was another. The third was the Morrill Tariff. As covered earlier, the Tariff
raised manufacturing imports, hitting profits in textiles and other industries across the
Atlantic. Angered British responses would inspire a pair of cartoons, published by
Harper’s Weekly that April, satirizing the apparent change. The first, set before its
passage, shows the British lion as a protector of the enslaved from the “bloodthirsty
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persecutions” of slaveholders.65 The second, set after, has the roles reversed, with the lion
now protecting slave holder and berating the slave for slacking in their work.66 These
images raised questioned how quickly Britain would abandon its principles on slavery –
those outlined by Russell for example – in the name of economic prosperity. A third
Northern print titled “John Bull Makes a Discovery,” released between 1862 and 1863,
conveys that this issue has not yet disappeared. Displaying John Bull inspecting imported
cotton, the case of the enslaved is still being ignored, their welfare or less import than the
benefits of cotton.67 Imagery such as these, while clearly adding a dash of hyperbole to
the reality of Britain’s situation, carry a bit of truth with them concerning the positions of
leadership on the issue. An economic downturn, such as what was caused by cotton
shortages as, will shape the views of those who guide policy, including tolerance of
slavery as an institution.
When the Secession Crisis broke out in 1860, followed by the eruption of Civil
War the following spring, the leadership of Great Britain faced challenges in maintaining
its neutrality. Shaping the course of 19th century Anglo-American relations, the
interactions between the Palmerston government and administrations of Lincoln and
Davis on a diplomatic level were shaped by the competing interests of each nation
involved. British and American arguments over the course of events such as the Trent
Affair and the debates over the Alabama serve as a precursor to post-war review of
neutrality and the rights of neutral and belligerent powers at sea. Such discussion includes

65

‘Harper’s Weekly, “Before the Morrill Tariff,” Still Image/Text, 1861, Harper’s Weekly, April 20,
1861, at https://library.artstor.org/#/object/SS7731291_7731291_10904218_GETTY.
66
Harper’s Weekly, “After the Morrill Tariff,” Still Image/Text, 1861, Harper’s Weekly, April 20,
1861, at https://library.artstor.org/#/object/SS7731291_7731291_10904216_GETTY.
67
Currier & Ives, John Bull Makes a Discovery, New York: Currier & Ives, 1862/1863, at
https://www.loc.gov/item/2003674569/.

42

the right of blockade or raises questions of accountability in questions concerning the
impact of commerce raiding. At the level of the British government, the issue of slavery
was not as influential as it would be within public circles. Reactions there to the role of
the practice in the onset of the Civil War, and the changes brought about partway through
regarding emancipation, reflect a general ambivalence about the American conflict. The
persistence of such feeling creates an impression that, despite the best efforts of
Confederate diplomatic outreach, British neutrality on aiding the South remained
resolute. Any British participation was more likely to develop through a deterioration of
relations between them and the North, a point that Seward, Adams, Lyons and Russell
would have been aware of.
Yet despite the fact that Britain remained neutral throughout the war, such an
outcome does not undermine the importance of the diplomatic factor of the conflict.
Other possible outcomes to controversy, particularly in the case of Trent or the Laird
Rams, would have altered the possibility of that secondary Anglo-American war
mentioned above. The military and economic threats that European leaders like
Palmerston were more concerned over, the latter of which the South was losing ground
on, were reflected in the remaining United States. As the conflict dragged on, the
solidifying ground upon which the Union cause stood pushed Britain and other European
powers further and further away from the idea of what would have been increasingly
considered interference in the North. In interpreting the story and issues of AngloAmerican diplomatic ties during this period, the significance of the work performed by
the State Departments and the Foreign Ministry to the development of the Atlantic World
is better understood.
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CHAPTER 2
In reviewing the stance of the Palmerston government on the United Kingdom’s
role in the events of the American Civil War, an overarching ambivalence to the
‘American affair’ can be seen. While sympathies for either the North or the South were
present throughout Parliament, interests in maintaining neutrality, rather than in
intervention, remained dominant. However, the use of direct diplomatic dialogue was not
the only approach taken by the belligerents and their sympathizers to generate foreign
support. Underlying the discourse between officials such as Seward, Adams, and Russell,
a secondary conflict was raging to win over the British public. The public’s opinion of
events across the Atlantic held the potential to place additional pressures upon leadership
to take action or not. As such, competing Union and Confederate influences upon the
British population’s attitudes on the war and its combatants developed in the first years of
the Civil War. While similar to government figures in being primarily ambivalent
towards the conflict, information and themes of the war nevertheless created divisions
within the public, shaped by influences foreign and domestic.
British opinion and the battles to sway it through outreach and propaganda were
influenced by several key factors. First, initial reactions at the war’s outbreak were
influenced by lingering memory of past interactions between England and the United
States, including confrontations and territorial disputes going back to the War of 1812.
Additionally, British understanding of American culture and identity, going into the era
of sectionalism and division, factor into these the pre-Civil War attitudes. Second,
Britain’s own interests in the 1850s and 60s further impacted public opinion, namely
concerns over events past and present in Continental Europe. The impact of the Crimean

44

War, the shifting balance between the great powers, and its own economic health all
carried weight in discussions of how to respond to the American Civil War. The
availability of information, and its presentation in different printed media, further shaped
public understanding and knowledge of the war, an obstacle that led into the influence of
outside factors.
Both Union and Confederate entities participating in the war of words to garner
support had to address or overcome these factors in the British attitudes, an effort that
took shape in multiple formats designed to reach broader audiences. Sympathetic writers
and propaganda networks utilized Britain’s growing audience of readers, finding
publications willing to print stories favorable to their cause. Public organizations, old and
new, capitalized on the events in America to draw attention to their significant themes,
even connecting them to reform causes in their own nation. This connects to the last point
of discussion, concerning the role of sentiments on slavery and emancipation. It has
already been noted that attitudes within the British government did not rule out support
for the Confederacy based on its continued use of slave labor alone. For the British
public, there is a similar question, not concerning who opposed slavery in the South, but
rather who remained sympathetic despite the institution.
While today the United States is part of multiple alliances and enjoys a close
relationship with the United Kingdom, the relationship between them in the mid-19th
century was one of repeated confrontation. Despite being key partners in trade, numerous
political and military disputes had arisen between England and its former colony since
the era of the Revolution. Avoiding military confrontation following the War of 1812,
American views of Britain had gradually soured over the years. With the rise of
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American nationalistic feeling developing out of the postwar Era of Good Feelings,
subsequent periods of growth saw new disagreement with its former parent. Disputes
over trade and the division of lands along the border with the Canadian provinces,
particularly concerning the Oregon territory in the 1840s, had incensed settlers and the
broader public. In a wartime issue concerning the Trent Affair, writers for Harper’s
Weekly described the recurrence of these pre-war disputes. Noting that at “half a dozen
times since 1814 occasions of war have arisen between this country and England, and
have always been adjusted by diplomacy,” they point out the role of negotiation in easing
the conflict, yet despite repeated resolutions bitter sentiments persisted.68 The early
development of the principles comprising Manifest Destiny – that vision of an ordained
American nation from sea to sea – combined with the interests of the Monroe Doctrine,
further tested American diplomacy with foreign powers.
While diplomacy found solutions to the immediate issues dividing the nations, it
could not address the grievances of those that felt the nation was insulted or impeded,
particularly among believers in the ideals of Manifest Destiny. This, combined with the
original factors contributing to the nation’s independence from Britain, only served to
incense the public. The 19th century French diplomat, Alexis de Tocqueville, notes this
resentment in his Democracy in America, as “nothing can be more virulent than the
hatred which exists between the Americans of the United States and the English.”69
American attitudes during the major controversies with the British Empire throughout the
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war – the Trent Affair, the Alabama and Laird Rams, and Southern belligerent
recognition – reflect what Tocqueville describes, that lingering animosity affecting
discourse both formal and informal between the two powers.
For the British, their view of the Anglo-American relationship displays similar, if
mirroring characteristics. Though anger over its move for independence had dissipated,
much like for the American public, memories of later interaction with the United States
remained more persistent. Prominent cases of this are the disagreements over
impressment and trade that had catalyzed the War of 1812 as well as the aforementioned
land disputes in the decades since. The 1837 outbreak of small, but armed, rebellions in
Canada was even supported by Americans sympathetic to the cause, foreshadowing
Northern fears during their own conflict 25 years later.70 American interest in, as well as
actual attempts at, seizing Canada alarmed Britain, and the standoff over the Oregon
territory exacerbated concerns over American expansionism on the North American
continent. It did not help that popular American publications raised such ideas in their
wartime coverage, including Harper’s Weekly’s suggestion that the North “might, if it
were deemed worthwhile, overrun Canada and add that wild and worthless region to our
dominion.”71 The United States was the unruly upstart on the world stage, and giving
ground to it in controversy was seen as blow to national pride. In their journeys
throughout the country, travelers from Britain and elsewhere, such as de Tocqueville,
judged the nation’s progress, based upon what they witnessed – from public decorum to
democratic principles. Dubrulle suggests that such practices were intended to determine
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“whether or not America had “succeeded”” in the experiment its founders had begun.72
For Americans, the identification of their faults by the British, whose society had its own
issues – social and political inequality for example – that needed reform, bred further
resentment. Though diplomacy repeatedly eased tension between the two nations
following the War of 1812, it could not reshape either nations’ view of the other.
Naturally, there were pre-war cases that serve as exceptions to these tendencies.
The 1860 tour of the North by Prince Edward, the Prince of Wales, which was received
with great public acclaim, is one such case. Fascination with the visiting royal surpassed
traditional American distaste for monarchs, leading to parades along crowded streets
throughout the country.73 The overall enthusiasm and welcome from both the government
and the public left the Prince and his entourage encouraged, hopeful for the future of the
Anglo-American relationship. Warren cites the words of Lord Lyons in describing such
feeling, writing “Politicians, he hoped, must now realize that they could no longer seek
popularity by attacking the mother country, and perhaps Englishmen would now abandon
“unfounded prejudices concerning the feelings, manners and habits of Americans.””74
Though tensions could certainly flare, cooler heads ultimately prevailed in disputes
between the U.S. and Britain, with resolutions regularly reached through means of
diplomacy rather than war.
But while examples of more amiable interaction occurred, the back and forth
rivalry between the U.S. and U.K. remained a significant theme of their relationship. By
the outbreak of the Civil War, the most prominent medium for it was in newsprint and
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accompanying illustration. Though it cannot be representative of the entire British
population, such work reflected themes found within the British perspective, from
criticism of American expansionism to satirical takes on its political failings. As such
feelings developed throughout the first half of the 19th century, American depictions
coalesced into a political character, a personification equivalent to that of John Bull, the
contemporary depiction of England. This Yankee caricature, a precursor for the later
Uncle Sam in its design, was termed by newspapers and magazines such as the London
Charivari, otherwise known as Punch, as Brother Jonathan. The character of Jonathan
served as means to exaggerate on the flaws outsiders saw in American culture and
government.
Such depictions continued into the period of the Civil War, in which Jonathan or
similar characters, meant to reflect the South, were used to mock their division as a
childlike squabble, something beneath the cares of the British. An example from the
political cartoons of Punch, an 1863 illustration by Sir John Tenniel titled ‘John Bull’s
Neutrality,’ conveys this theme (Figure 1). The artist captures public and press
frustrations with the war’s combatants, both of which inconvenienced Britain with their
continued fighting.75 For many, the North and the South were equally at blame for the
disruption caused by the conflict. This aids in explaining why interests in intervention in
the Civil War, to force mediation on neither side’s direct behalf, developed early on.
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Figure 1. John Bull’s Neutrality; By Sir John Tenniel Punch, October 3rd, 1863; Captioned – “Look
here boys, I don’t care twopence for your noise, but if you throw stones at my windows, I must
thrash you both.”

Given these examples of British views of the pre-war relationship with the United
States, it is understandable that apathy or disinterest in intervening emerged when
American sectionalism rose to its highest in the 1850s. Like leadership in the Palmerston
government, including the Prime Minister himself, there were those in the public that
thought the fracturing of the Union was something deserved, if not an inevitability.
British doubts over the potential of the American experiment manifested throughout the
era. An 1861 letter of support to President Lincoln, written by an English rector, reveals
these misgivings concerning democratic principles. Henry Bart, congratulating Lincoln
and lamenting the impact of the war, goes even further in his writing: “Surely, sir, you
must have discovered that democratic institutions are not equal to meet such a crisis as
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the present. Nothing short of a monarchy will suffice.”76 Such a proposal speaks to yet
another British view of events surrounding the war, specifically concerning the powers of
the presidency. Understanding of the executive power Lincoln wielded during the war,
particularly in regards to his methods in dealing with the remaining border states of the
Union, is important. While certainly not rising to the level of a monarch, his actions
would play into Southern accusations that he wielded the power of his office as a tyrant.
Interpretations of who believed what, and which group supported which side, that
lean into generalizations do not fully account for the different factors and interests at play
not only within the government, but society as well. For some citizens, the conflict in
America was a test of democracy that carried the potential to reshape the balance of the
Atlantic world, worthy of attention. Others simply saw the conflict as far out of the range
Britain’s immediate interests, with more pressing matters closer to home, particularly
concerning the balance of power among the European nations. What was it to the British
if the Americans fought among themselves, particularly as it navigated European
alliances and the buildup towards imperialistic rivalry? Why become involved in the
domestic issues of a nation separated by thousands of miles of ocean, when the likes of
France, Russia, and Prussia competed for power and influence?
Despite sharing interests among the other powers concerning the economic effects
of the Civil War, at several points in the first years of war, the prospect of coordinated
action faltered. On the consideration of a joint mediation, political concerns, alongside
varying levels of public support, impeded cooperation.77 Russia was among the
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contemporaries on the continent that the British government and public watched in the
aftermath of the Crimean War. Its move during the Civil War to shelter its warships in
New York City’s harbor, without any intention of actual military support to the North,
overshadowed concurrent, but genuine, British naval efforts to reinforce peace. City
residents flocked to the Russian vessels, while largely ignoring the presence of British
Admiral Milne.78 Lingering distrust regularly impeded strong cooperation between the
fractious powers of Europe on addressing events between North and South.
These factors carried with them the potential for more immediate consequences to
Britain’s own power and the security of its Empire abroad. Therefore, the focus of its
foreign engagement was upon monitoring the stability of Europe. A foreign conflict was
anathema to these interests, both as a distraction and an unnecessary expenditure of
resources. Furthermore, for much of the British populace, the consequences of war had
left a powerful memory in the decade prior to the Civil War. The Crimean War from
1853 to 1856, between the Russian Empire and an Ottoman Empire backed by alliance of
European nations, including Britain and France, left a scar on the nation and its attitudes
towards war. Casualties and illness wore down British troops, and the prolonged conflict
made the war increasingly unpopular as it drew on. Myers writes of how these issues
factored into a brief pre-Civil War incident between Britain and the U.S from 1855-56. In
a scheme to recruit Americans for the war effort, addressing rising losses, then minister to
the U.S., John Crampton, established a network that violated American law under the
Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818. Under suspicion by the administration of Franklin Pierce
of violating American neutrality, Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon recalled Crampton
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once his work was uncovered.79 At that time, the prolonged nature of the war in Europe
and its growing unpopularity in Britain necessitated the prevention of any escalation with
the United States.
It should also be noted that the U.S., while officially neutral, had nevertheless
made a small contribution to the Russian war effort that briefly spurred British
resentment. U.S.-Russian relations fluctuated regularly during the 18th and 19th century,
in the era of Crimea and the Civil war being more favorable, though their interaction
remained limited. With Americans volunteering their aid and U.S. ships transporting
provisions of supplies and weapons to Russia, such support drew Britain’s ire until later
American support for it during the “Indian Mutiny of 1857-58.”80 The fluctuating
contention of the 1850s serves as the precursor for Anglo-American relations during the
Civil War, shaped by domestic and international developments following Crimea.
The effects of the Crimean War would be carried into later conflicts of the
century, including the American Civil War five years later, having set new precedents on
warfare and attitudes concerning it. The conflict served as a testing ground for developing
weaponry and equipment, factors contributing to its casualty rate. But beyond advances
in soldiers’ armaments, technologies such as the railroad and telegraph were increasingly
being utilized to facilitate transport and communication.81 This incorporation in turn
facilitated greater coverage of the Crimean conflict by the nation’s war correspondents,
which in turn expedited the growth of the British press. For the first time, the public back
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home was better able to follow events in distant parts of Europe, with reporters such as
William Howard Russell of The Times going on to cover the American conflict in 1861.
Joel Weiner ties public interest in the Crimean War to the “rise of a penny press,”
facilitating cheaper access to papers, leading into an “insatiable desire for war news.”82
Such interests would promptly factor into consumption of news relating to the
deteriorating situation in the States from 1860 onward.
Despite the importance of concerns closer to home, news of the Civil War in
America, when it could published, still had an audience in the British public. Though far
away, the performance of the Union and Confederacy on the battlefield drew the public
eye, playing its own role in the growth of the early modern British press. Dubrulle
suggests that, in covering the war, the British press helped the issue gain greater
significance to the British population, which in turn elevated the publications involved.83
However, there are two factors to note in the transmission of information across the
Atlantic that shaped public understanding. First was the ever-present delay in
communication back and forth, which affected correspondents’ dispatches just as it did
diplomacy. As no trans-Atlantic telegraph cable had yet been established, the first line
being laid down in 1866, British readers only learned of events in America weeks after
they happened, carried by ship.84 In the time it took to transmit news, British and
American readers abroad were left in suspense over military, political and diplomatic
developments. This delay further factors into the second influence upon public
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interpretation of the American Civil War, being found in the interests of the publications
that covered it. This was not a factor limited to the instruments of Union and Confederate
propaganda that emerged from 1861 onward. To compensate for slow or limited news,
non-affiliated British papers published editorials and opinion pieces remarking on the
conflict, giving glimpses of different perspectives and opinion. Even leading
publications, such as The London Times, were shaped by the sentiments of their editors
and reading audience.
In examining the prominent publications that covered the war, the role of The
Times presents an intriguing case study of press influence and bias. One of the foremost
papers in England, the Times had been among those that had benefitted from the growth
of the nation’s news consumption in the mid-century, gaining in influence in politics and
society. Its foremost war reporter, William Howard Russell, with experience from the
Crimean conflict, placed himself so as to cover both events on the battlefield and in the
U.S. and Confederate capitals. His coverage of the disastrous Union performance in, and
subsequent retreat from, the opening shots at First Bull Run, was printed on both sides of
the Atlantic. Earning “him the contempt of Northerners as “Bull-Run Russell,” the
account fed early sympathies for a South that appeared able to defeat its enemy.85 From
Bull Run onward, the fluidity of the Times’s approach to coverage made it a frequent
target of criticism from Northerners. Their criticism was likely deserved, as Blackett
notes the Times’s view that Union sympathies were scarce among those of good standing,
a self-reference to the editors and prominent supporters.86 Its reporting clearly conveyed
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biases against the North, later highlighted by author Sir Leslie Stephen in a critique of the
editors’ positions. Stephen argued that the Times too often resorted to presenting its own
prophetical guesses on the course of the war, particularly in its early years. Predicting
Union losses that were avoided, the Border States seceding when in fact they remained
throughout the war, and from the beginning, espousing ideas on the war’s inevitable
victor, the publication had a poor track record of accuracy in such statements.87 The
Times’s foreboding speculations for the North, circulating to its readers both in the
general public and in the British government, shaped understanding of and reaction to the
events unfolding across the Atlantic.
But beyond certain biases and its penchant for prediction, the Times’s style of
reporting presented another flaw, particularly in its descriptions of slavery. In a study of
the paper’s role, Fulton notes that the publication more often than not took a conservative
stance on popular issues ranging from labor reforms to political actions, supporting the
status quos of British society.88 While the Times was not explicitly pro-slavery in its
commentary on the issue, and its significance in American society, it also did not take a
direct stance one way or the other. Fulton says of the Times, that “the paper preferred
questions that could be reduced to black and white terms,” and the debate over slavery
had turned the question into a significant grey area for international onlookers.89
Altogether, it is understandable why the Confederacy saw coverage of the North and
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slavery in papers like the Times as beneficial, even if it was not always in direct
alignment with their own interests.
Despite the well-read status, The Times’s approach to coverage does not account
for other native British publications. Among the non-affiliated press, there are clear
examples of that sense of ambivalence and overall frustration with the effects of the
ongoing war. The Illustrated London News, for example, largely operated from a neutral
standpoint, split in their condemnation of both North and South. In interpreting their
stance on opinion and their own approach, Campbell cites the policy its editors laid out:
“We have no sympathy with those who are seeking to crush a nation that desires
to be isolated; we have no sympathy with a nation that upholds the atrocious
system of slavery. But we admire the valour on both sides, and we lament the
cruel and useless sacrifice of life. That is the English standpoint, and we are
neither to be menaced, cajoled nor taunted into abandoning it.”90
The performance of the soldiers, their gallantry on both sides of the conflict, providing its
readership with intriguing accounts of the Union and Confederacy alike. These stories
would in turn, be supplemented by the paper’s illustrations, presenting military scenes as
well as images of domestic life in the North and South. Looking again at the example of
slavery, such illustrations provide insight into the views of the institution in a society at
war. An 1863 image, titled ‘Domestic Life in South Carolina,’ depicts white and black
families living together in a Southern scene of racial harmony (Figure 2).91 The amiable
themes of this first image clash with another from 1863, titled ‘The War in America’
(Figure 3). This second image shows a line of black laborers working on the fortifications
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of Savannah, Georgia, likely as slave labor given the location.92 With the inclusion of
these images, the Illustrated News presents differing instances of the institution, avoiding
leaning too far into the Southern view of slavery as a ‘positive good.’ Such an approach,
not providing either side the appearance of an explicit preference, gives credence to the
paper’s asserted policy of neutrality.

Figure 2. Domestic Life in South Carolina – From a Sketch by Our Special Artist. From the Illustrated
London News; May 23, 1863.

Figure 3. The War in America: Negroes at Work on the Fortifications at Savannah – From a
Sketch by Our Special Artist. From The Illustrated London News, April 18, 1863.
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However, there are still cases of more visible sympathies, to one side or the other,
among native British publications of the period. Of particular note is the Morning Star, a
daily publication based in London. The Star was one of the few, if only, prominent
British publications to outright support the Union in its war effort. Operated by Samuel
Lucas, its pages espoused arguments that were chiefly anti-slavery and anti-Confederacy,
though it was not a direct line of Northern propaganda. In analysis of the Star’s role in
reporting the war and its politics, Borchard and Bulla make note of the British press’s
response to the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863. They assert that, in comparison with
its peers and rivals, such as the Times, which expressed doubts over its effects, the
Morning Star adopted a position that welcomed and celebrated the decision.93 Lucas’s
ardent anti-slavery interests are most certainly the defining factor behind his support of
Lincoln and the Union cause, even prior to official action on emancipation. Concerning
his view of the president, Mahin argues that the Star was again one of only several papers
that credited Lincoln for his work in foreign policy. In particular, it recognized his
“efforts throughout the war to maintain peaceful relations with Britain,”94 a role in which
today Lincoln is usually overshadowed. The Star thus proved to be a reliable ally to the
Northern cause among the British press, offering support where most other publications
were either neutral or opposed Unionist sentiment.
The deteriorating situation between the North and South, and the themes of the
ensuing war, covered issues ranging from secession to slavery. It gave journalists and
illustrators extensive material to draw upon in continued critiques of American society
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and government, both serious and satirical. Political cartoons were, and still are, effective
ways of presenting information, Christopher Kent noting that they were “vaguer, more
emotive and participatory,” their nature as imagery making them more “accessible to
all.”95 Interpreting issues through clever captions and imagery was easier to digest for a
larger amount of people, even with the growth of literacy. Looking back at the character
of Brother Jonathan and similar depictions of American politics, the Civil War brought
about an updated interpretation. Imagery with Jonathan, now alongside a twin
representing the South, captures the rivalry as frustrated Brits saw it, more often
capturing American stereotypes of discourtesy, uncouthness and general stubbornness.96
The wartime transformation of the character placed it as the more obstinate of the two,
evidenced by a July, 1861 cartoon from Punch titled ‘Naughty Jonathan (Figure 4). It
depicts the titular character in the midst of a tantrum concerning prospects of foreign
intervention in his fight, thrown in front of the motherly figure of Britain.97 The image
reflects early views that the U.S. was overplaying its hand, and that the foreign policy of
Lincoln and Seward was driven by Northern anger at the South and Britain.
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Figure 4. Naughty Jonathan; By Sir John Tenniel, Punch July 6, 1861; Captioned – “You shan’t
interfere, Mother – And you ought to be on my side – And it’s a great shame – And I don’t care –
And you shall interfere – And I won’t have it.”

Moving to the impact of economic change in the Atlantic World, which the
markets and factories of England dominated, disruptions in the wake of secession and the
American Civil War affected large portions of the nation’s industry. Both the North and
South were prominent cornerstones of trade between the Old World and the New, both as
exporters and importers. With the beginning of war, the previous system of the
antebellum period deteriorated. Jones writes that “the North American economy was a
vital cog in the ocean trade, and the longer the fighting continued, the more other nations
suffered from the commercial disruption of what had become an integrated Atlantic
network.”98 Britain’s concerns, following a Southern embargo and the Union blockade,
lay in their access to a sufficient supply of cotton for textile manufacturing, as well as the
supply of foodstuffs from the North. While temporarily supplementing cotton stockpiles
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through colonial production in the east, this was not enough to prevent shortages
throughout the country.
In Lancashire, the mills of Manchester faced economic depression, with factory
closures and growing unemployment resulting from the cotton famines. Instances of
economic downturns throughout the war generated unrest at the war’s continuance,
reflected in the words of Henry Adams, the son of the U.S. envoy, to his brother in an
1862 letter. Adams, who served as a secretary for his father, writes of growing interest in
mediation among the nations affected by cotton shortages, noting that “the suffering
among the people in Lancashire and in France is already very great and is increasing
enormously every day.”99 Public pressures, straining pre-existing relief programs,
generated further anger in the populace. Blackett notes that responses to poor relief
among unemployed workers ranged from organized meetings and “vigorous but peaceful
protest,” to several instances of more violent protest, occasionally set among pro-Union
or pro-Confederate gatherings.100 However, as reflected in the critique from Punch, the
overall feeling could also be directed at both combatants for contributing to the lingering
economic hardship. What did arise from the coordination of mill workers around the
country as a result of the famines was the growth of their role in political activism. This
would subsequently lead into the calls for political and social reform in Britain that rose
once more in the aftermath of the American Civil War.
The United States faced a series of challenges in its efforts to maintain the
goodwill of the British public throughout the war, presented by its opponent, by Britain,
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and by its own early efforts. In presenting the Union’s justifications for war amid the
Civil War’s beginnings, both the Lincoln Administration and sympathizers abroad
actively avoided representing the U.S.’s focus as being upon the ending of slavery.
Though the issue had intensely divided the nation throughout the decades preceding the
conflict, it was not a central aim of Union efforts until 1863. To identify the struggle with
the South as one of emancipation presented problems close to home, due to the lingering
unpopularity of such a measure. However, that does not mean that Union operations
discounted slavery as a factor entirely. Jones argues that the administration saw slavery as
“the root cause of the Union-Confederate struggle,” believing “the British astute enough
to recognize the obvious.”101 This, however, meant that the most visible argument put
forward was Lincoln’s one of reunification – that the South had illegally seceded from
the Union and that it had every right to go to war to gain it back. However, in making
such an argument, the North left itself exposed to criticism from Britain and the South.
Had the United States not formed as a result of a separation from its parent nation, as the
British were well aware? What was different in the South’s case that justified the North’s
actions that, to some, were hypocritical and reflected the Confederacy’s claims of
overbearing tyranny?
Printed works, as with most efforts in advertising a cause to the public, were a
prominent method of the North and its sympathizers to attempt to sway the British public.
Influencers such as Thurlow Weed and others used their connections to different
publications, established through prior business, to submit letters to be published, or
conveyed stories for their editors to include. In a late 1863 letter to President Lincoln
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from London, New Jersey politician James Scovel makes mention of his interactions with
the British public, among them the editor of the Morning Star, Samuel Lucas. As earlier
discussed, the paper was one of the few British publications to openly support the North.
Scovel notes the work of Lucas through the paper, including an anticipated article on
Lincoln’s role in turning the war around over the course of 1863.102 But American efforts
did not rest upon the work of the British press alone. Though the Lincoln Administration
did not organize official ventures into propaganda themselves, Americans abroad worked
independently to support the Union cause.
An American paper active in supporting the North was the London American,
founded by John Adams Knight in 1860. Not initially meant for propaganda, intended
instead as a means for Americans abroad to stay informed, the paper changed in response
to the war.103 Following news of the attack on Fort Sumter, Knight shifted his work from
a neutral stance to that of a Unionist. Soon, his publication found itself part of the
competition with Southern rivals in the press, including Hotze’s Index. Throughout his
efforts, Knight appealed to the Union government for greater action in order for a
coordinated response to Confederate activity. This included asking for financial support,
as many of its British subscribers had canceled with the paper’s sharp turn in tone.
However, the Lincoln administration expressed no interests in pursuing such a venture.104
While Lincoln became a subscriber, Knight did not receive government funding to
support further operations. Instead, he had to draw solely upon his subscriber base in
Britain, which again, was for the most part Americans abroad, with the contributions of
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likeminded writers, public speakers and interest groups.105 However, the London
American encountered increasing difficulties in continuing operations, finally shutting
down in March, 1863.106 For the rest of the war, those active in Unionist outreach utilized
additional methods to convince the public of the cause.
Accompanying the work of publications like Knight’s The London American,
operatives and organizers drew on oration as a method of public outreach. To utilize this
effectively, agents and sympathetic circles arranged events featuring public speakers
whose presentation of arguments, their own or otherwise, could better resonate with an
audience. The North’s official diplomats were not particularly involved in such action,
preferring instead written communication in their professional duties. Mahin notes that
Minister Adams in particular “was a poor public speaker,” unwilling to give public
addresses of such a nature.107 However, some of the orators that participated in this
activity were either well-known in British circles, or were Americans that became so over
time. For example, James Scovel also makes note of his work in public speaking
activities in late 1863. Speaking throughout the country, he specifically mentions in his
letter to Lincoln the good reception that his use of the president’s name evoked from the
audience.108 As Lincoln’s popularity with the British public grew in the latter half of the
war, it is understandable that his presence would factor into the arguments made on his
and the Union’s behalf.
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Another figure in public speaking, an American businessmen residing in England
during the war named George Francis Train, was also an active Unionist orator, giving
several public speeches throughout England in 1862. Later circulated through the London
American, they presented an intriguing defense of the Union cause, as well as criticism of
British stances concerning said cause.109 Contrary to other appeals, Train’s speech
addressed the issue of slavery in American society. However, his argument presents a
racially-biased view of the institution as a civilizing benefit to the enslaved before
emancipation, effectively a ‘positive good.’ He does call out British consumption of
slave-made products, from cotton and food to clothing, as a response to critics of the
institution, though his primary target remains a treasonous Confederacy.110 In a separate
speech on the matter of the impact of southern independence, Train provides his audience
both critiques of society in the South and a defense of the Union position in the war,
using humor and American and British historical precedents to make his points. He
rebukes concerns that America wanted the Canadian territories, believing them wholly
different from one another, going on to argue in support of clemency for secessionists,
the intention being that living free in a restored U.S. was its own punishment.111
Eccentric and hostile in the delivery of his speeches, as well as other contributions to the
London American, Train’s efforts did not endear him to those in public circles outside of
groups already sympathetic to the Union.
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“You will be diligent and earnest in your efforts to impress upon the public mind
abroad the ability of the Confederate States to maintain their independence.”112 In a
dispatch from Confederate Secretary of State, R.M.T. Hunter, instructions for how to
proceed with his mission were provided to Henry Hotze. Hotze was a Swiss-American
agent of the C.S.A. government, travelling to London with the commission of swaying
the British public to the Southern side. To achieve the goals laid out by Hunter, Hotze
developed a network of connections throughout British media, circles of influence, and
literary professionals. He developed his own weekly publication, The Index, to provide
detailed accounts of events in the South, utilizing reports smuggled through the blockade
along with his own additions and interpretations of popular issues, including race and
slavery.
In examining the Confederate appeal, several key themes emerge throughout
various efforts, designed to be complementary of the work performed by the official
diplomatic envoys. Calls for southern recognition and the persistent issue of the cotton
trade were two prominent elements in the resulting arguments. The appeal for Southern
recognition, when diplomatic approaches saw no desired resolutions, expanded to include
the public sphere. Popular pamphlets, read by the public and leading politicians alike,
espoused the benefits of greater cooperation with an independent Confederacy, such as
Liverpool businessman James Spence’s The American Union. Spence, an agent of the
South, laid out a defense of the secessionists, arguing that a defense of slavery had not
been the deciding factor, and of the economic benefit of renewed trade.113 The matter of
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economic relief for Britain’s woes concerning the cotton supply and other markets was
not lost on the Confederacy. However, though it had the leverage of having the desired
materials in high demand, the South did not have the ability to profit off of it. Despite the
promise of stronger economic benefit to Britain, the Union blockade remained a key
impediment to British interests. Moving to break the blockade risked escalating to war,
thus resulting into the limited amounts of smuggled cotton being available for Britain’s
consumption.
Like the Union’s methods, the Confederacy and its sympathizers did not limit
themselves to appeals in printed form. Beyond the papers, broadsheets and pamphlets that
circulated, interest groups organized various events, from public rallies to speeches by
orators – primarily sympathetic intellectuals and persons of influence within the circles of
Hotze and others. Men such as James Spence addressed crowds of the British workingclass, or their own peers, in an effort to persuade them to support the Southern cause. In
an 1862 speech by Spence, also concerning the matter of Southern recognition, the
businessman makes reference to the relations of the North and South with Britain. In the
South’s defense, he argues “Here is a continent of which one half is full of ineradicable
hostility, sometimes latent but ever there; the other half anxious to be friendly.”114
Together, Hotze and Spence also took further action on the matter of the cotton supply,
with the latter reaching out to leaders in mill labor around Britain. In one case, Spence
coordinated “mass demonstrations” by groups of the working-class, rallied by “veteran
strike leaders, William Aitken and Mortimer Grimshaw,” who were angered by the
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perceived economic exploitation of cotton workers by the North.115 In using these
methods, Confederate operatives sought to build upon the growing frustration of Britain
concerning the conflict, at the time having no end in sight.
The actual impact of the Confederacy’s work to sway public opinion in Britain
was less than what had been desired by those who had commissioned Hotze and others.
In Hotze’s case, his paper, The Index, only ever had a small circulation of sympathetic
readers. Confederate Senator Clement Clay was one of those in the South dissatisfied that
the Confederate government had spent limited resources on ventures of little return.
Writing, “I apprehend The Index has but few readers besides its patrons and our open and
active friends,” Clay argues that the paper’s editors failed to “reach the minds of the great
body of the English public.”116 Among the other reasons for its failure are a lack of
cooperation between it and other prominent agents of the Confederacy, Edwin de Leon in
particular. De Leon, describing the Hotze-Index mission, argues that its inherent biases
and interests were more readily apparent to the British public, believing “that the
Confederate label placed openly upon it would mar its utility and confine its
circulation.”117 Both Clay and de Leon’s critiques were accurate, as the paper only
reached around 2,250 subscribers in its lifetime.118 Like the Union’s louder parts of its
propaganda effort, Confederate success was limited to those already aligned, failing to
attract more of the general population to its side.
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Events during the latter half of the war made it increasingly difficult for
Confederate propaganda to present arguments in their favor. The major contributing
problem, the increasing number of Union victories appearing in the British press,
overshadowed the stories of Southern military capability. Lincoln’s actions on
emancipation in the same period breathed new life into the underlying issue for all
Southern agents and sympathizers. Could the South present itself as a just society and
maintain its institution of slavery? The persistent problems surrounding that institution
became an even greater obstacle to their efforts to convince the public, more so than it
was for their official envoys in negotiation. Despite continuous efforts to downplay or
ignore the issue until late in the war, slavery grew to be an irremovable weight upon the
Confederate appeal in Europe.
By the Civil War, British abolitionist sentiment had waned from its earlier
prominence. While still an issue that united most of the nation against it, ardent
opposition to slavery was at a level similar to its presence in the United States. Interest in
the topic had in no means dissipated, evidenced in the widespread popularity of published
slave experiences. Among the most widely consumed works was Harriet Beecher
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, a fictional account with a description of affairs in the South
that nevertheless captured British attention.119 That Southerners raised fury over Stowe’s
descriptions of slavery in America furthered British curiosity over the realities of the
institution. Moreover, interest in the cause of abolition remained, with invested societies
focused upon public awareness and international reform following Britain’s passage of
abolition in the 1830s. English travelers in the U.S. before and during the Civil War
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provided further accounts of slavery, shedding light on the extent of these lingering
stances. As Arthur Fremantle, a British officer who toured the South in 1863, said of
experiences with the institution and the war, at first his “sympathies were rather in favor
of the North, on account of the dislike which an Englishman feels at the idea of
slavery.”120 However, his writing goes on to cover a shift in attitude, juxtaposing the
warm reception of Southern society with accounts of the racial tensions and violence in
the North. Fremantle bore witness to the New York City Draft Riots in July, which
quickly escalated into indiscriminate attacks on black individuals and communities
throughout the city.121 Such events, coupled with the North’s overall lack of action to
address the issue, understandably suggested to the British public that there was not
enough support in the North to pursue the issue.
However, even among lingering elements of organized anti-slavery action there
was doubt and hesitation on the matter of a war over slavery. Division among religious
denominations provide examples of this, particularly in the case of historically
abolitionist groups like the Quakers. On both sides of the Atlantic, Quakers had served
prominent roles in early anti-slavery causes going back to the 18th century. Yet another
tenant of the faith was pacifism, and the idea of a war over slavery presented a clash of
principle between Quaker groups in Britain and America. In an 1863 message to North
American Quakers, the London Society of Friends appealed to their duty to following the
Gospel, hopeful that they would “plead effectually for peace with those on whom the
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awful responsibility of continuing the war more immediately devolves.”122 Arguing that
American Quakers, believed to be caught up in the emotions of the war, should be
espousing the cause of peace, English Quakers sought their aid in ending the conflict and
cultivating relations between their nations. In a response to the resolution of the London
Society later in the year, William Wood and the New York Society argued against the
stance taken by their British counterparts. Wood asserts that the British government,
“instead of cultivating relations of peace and friendship, tends to enmity and future
strife,” arguing that the blame for continued war lies “with our misguided fellow citizens
in the Southern states, and those who aid and encourage them in this and other lands.”123
Peace could not prevail this way, so long as sympathies for the Southern cause, or other
interests in undermining the U.S., were present among those who called for a resolution.
Moreover, for American Quakers, reaching such an end to the war would weaken their
nation, as well as risk the continued perpetuation of slavery on the American continent.
This reluctance on the part of anti-slavery groups impacted success of early Union
appeals, but was even further compounded by faults in the North’s initial messaging
concerning what its purpose going to war was. As has been noted, the Union’s arguments
in its public outreach was hampered by several factors concerning its reasons for war, an
issue capitalized upon by rival Confederate appeals - to their initial benefit. Justification
was based upon the aim of reunification after unlawful secession, for “many northerners
strongly opposed the abolitionists and staunchly rejected a war against slavery.”124 The
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maintenance of U.S. control over the slave-holding states along the dividing line made
avoiding such a conflict imperative. Any move towards addressing slavery further,
particularly in the conflict first two years with no clear upper hand, played into Southern
arguments against an aggressive North. Thurlow Weed, monitoring foreign opinion,
writes of early concerns regarding issues surrounding an abolition-based appeal. He notes
the spread of the idea in the European public that “the Election of an “Abolition
President” was to be followed by violent emancipation,” the very fears of pacifist groups
like the London Society of Friends.125 However, as time would show, such concerns
proved to be unnecessary.
Yet, despite the delay in the Union on addressing the matter of slavery, the
Confederacy had its own problems in how to present its justification for war. Responding
to questions on slavery and ideas of emancipation in 1863, Hotze used The Index to
promote popular arguments defending the institution. Such a change, this “emancipation
scheme of the North,” stood against “the interests of mankind and civilization.”126
American society in the South had benefitted from slavery’s presence, and not just
economically. The argument of slavery as a positive good stipulated that it benefitted
both the slaver and the enslaved, and without it, social order and stability would diminish.
Naturally, such an argument was meant to suppress the significance of the South’s
continued reliance on slavery as a source of labor well into the 19th century. That the
institution would likely continue to survive for the foreseeable future if the independent
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South endured, and by extension Britain’s use of the produced cotton to fuel
manufacturing was not lost upon the public. In a March, 1862, broadside printed by the
London Daily News, the argument rests upon the belief that “The new government is not
only ostentatiously founded on slavery, but it seeks to become established for the avowed
purpose of perpetuating and extending this abomination.”127 Shared sentiments among
the British concerning slavery, while not the deciding factor preventing support for the
Confederates at the war’s beginning, had risen to a greater prominence in its latter half.
The decision by President Lincoln in 1862 to pursue complete emancipation made
waves in the diplomatic atmosphere of the Civil War. For the British public, the move
garnered wide-ranging reactions, though many expressed ardent support for the
President’s decision, if not the Union itself as well. Though some carried doubts over the
ability of the U.S. to follow through with such actions, sentiment shared by publications
like the Times and supported by Hotze and other Confederates, such feeling was
overshadowed by growing public enthusiasm. Certain groups publicly rallied behind the
shift in the North’s war aims, such as the London-based Emancipation Society, which
“eulogised the American government as the emancipator of the negro and the champion
of equal justice without distinction of race.”128 The new focus on the final destruction of
slavery within the United States with a Northern victory served as an inspiration for
others, helping to catalyze public interest in pursuing social and political change in
Britain. Jones asserts that, for those involved in early labor movements, supporting the
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North aligned with their goals at for improving the lot of the working class at home.129
Outside intervention in the American conflict, likely serving to undermine or prevent a
Union victory, would only hinder British reform efforts.
A prominent example of such sentiment appears among the mill workers of
Manchester, for whom the President’s actions instilled new resolve in regards to reform
causes. Though such gatherings risked a response from mill owners and anti-Unionists,
many felt that the cause of the Union on ideals of free labor increasingly aligned with
interests in their own status as part of the British working class. Their gathering on New
Year’s Eve, 1862 included arguments on the nature of Southern sympathies in Britain,
supporters that worked “to disguise the fact that the South rebelled to conserve,
perpetuate, and extend slavery.”130 For the working-men gathered in Manchester’s Free
Trade Hall that evening, shared enthusiasm made it clear which side merited their
support. Though the effects of the cotton famines persisted, the participants noted that
“there had been no meetings in the South to assist the unemployed operatives in
Lancashire,” while in the North there were public gatherings in New York aimed at
economic relief.131 In a famed correspondence with Lincoln, this meeting of citizens and
laborers issued a resolution of support for the President and his actions. Their message is
one of hope, stating: “Heartily do we congratulate you and your country on this humane
and righteous course. We assume that you cannot now stop short of the complete

129

Jones, Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom, 94.
[N.A.], “Address From the Working Men to President Lincoln, Manchester Guardian, January
1, 1863” In Manchester and Abraham Lincoln: A Side-Light on an Earlier Fight for Freedom, ed. F. Hourani,
4-9, (Manchester: R. Aikman & Son, 1900), 5. Online at
https://archive.org/details/manchesterabraha00hour/mode/2up.
131
[N.A.], “Address from the Working Men,” 9.
130

75

uprooting of slavery.”132 The President would go on to respond to their message, offering
thanks and asserting that “through the action of disloyal citizens, the working men of
Europe have been subjected to a severe trial for the purpose of forcing their sanction,” to
strong-arm European support.133 With Lincoln’s actions, support for an independent
South became increasingly equated with opposing the North’s ideals for freedom in a just
society.
Naturally, the announcement of emancipation, though encouraging to many, left
lingering doubts in others that such a process would be honored. Beyond British
leadership, speculative talk in the press - propaganda or otherwise - and in public circles
wondered at Lincoln’s ability to actually follow-through with the action. This view was
not without precedent. O’Connor notes that, during Britain’s own abolition progress in
the 1830s, attention was paid to poor treatment of freed blacks in the Northern states if
the U.S., as well as to the limited support for abolitionist policies.134 At the time of its
official release, the Emancipation Proclamation still held no legal power to enforce the
freedom of slaves in the rebel states, though it inspired new waves of escapees as news
spread. Early British reaction to emancipation included those of Punch’s political
cartoons by John Tenniel. Following the preliminary announcement by Lincoln in the fall
of 1862, the publication printed an illustration titled “Abe Lincoln’s Last Card” (Figure
5). The president, seated opposite of a Confederate soldier, throws down a card
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emblazoned with a black spade, signifying what opponents suggested was a last attempt
to achieve a Union victory.135 Lincoln’s move was certainly a gamble concerning its
potential impact upon foreign support. However Punch’s satire, as well as the contrasting
work of those that sought to disparage the move, including Southern operations, painted
it as an act of desperation.

Figure 5. Abe Lincoln’s Last Card; Or, Rouge-et-Noir. By Sir John Tenniel. Punch, October 18, 1862.

Others made similar arguments as the Quakers concerning wars of emancipation,
though for separate reasons. Expressing concerns of new waves of violence in America,
beyond military engagement of the North and South, more conservative circles argued
that in the mass emancipation of the enslaved, Lincoln opened the door to racial revolt. In
an 1863 letter published in The Times, the anonymous contributor echoes the arguments
of Hotze and other defenders of the institution as necessary to order in Southern society.
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Such directions were “advocating a measure which is not freedom to the blacks, but is, as
far as possible, massacre to the women and children of the whites,” suggesting a rebellion
of vengeance in the aftermath of emancipation.136 Again, these fears and warnings proved
to be unfounded, based upon racial bigotries or early cultural and anthropological,
‘science-based’ studies of race – themselves biased.
President Lincoln’s association with the cause of emancipation helped to endear
him to international audiences, becoming known as the ‘Great Emancipator’. His role as
commander-in-chief, overseeing the Union’s significant turnaround in military
performance, erased earlier doubts over his ability to manage military and domestic
affairs in a fractured nation. Despite his direct role in Anglo-American relations ending
with his assassination in April, 1865, public memory of Lincoln garnered the late
President countless eulogies and honors from across the Atlantic. Such tributes came
even from among those who had frequently mocked the President – for his looks, his
frontier upbringing, or his performance in the office – during the war. Punch, which had
frequently utilized the image of the president for its satirical cartoons of issues in the
U.S., printed both an image, showing the symbolic figure of Britannia mourning Lincoln
alongside Columbia, as well as an accompanying poem.137 The latter’s verses reflect
upon prior depictions of the man, including allusions to the work that led to the
improvement of his reputation at home and abroad.138 Crucial to solidifying arguments
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for the Union abroad, Lincoln’s role in establishing the destruction of American slavery
ultimately generated the responses that the president had hoped, in the process gaining
international esteem with foreign onlookers.
British public sentiment, on a broad scale, carried the same attitudes of overall
ambivalence towards the American Civil War as the British government. While there are
trends in viewpoints that correlate with factors such as class, there remains diversity of
opinion within these different groups. The working class was not united behind the
North, and the aristocracy with not purely sympathetic to the South. Furthermore, in
analyzing reaction to emancipation, it should not be interpreted that later British
responses to the move alone signified greater support of the Union. Certainly as the war
drew into its last months, public sympathy to the North and its cause of emancipation
through reunification grew, surpassing earlier doubts. A more precise understanding
would be that Britain was ever-increasingly less likely to intervene on the Confederacy’s
behalf. It was a combination of attitudes concerning the themes and issues raised by the
Civil War that solidified the British position. The interests of labor and political reform
causes, alongside with the government’s own unwillingness to involve itself, kept Britain
entirely out of the conflict through to its resolution.
In examining the variety of formats utilized and arguments presented by
propaganda and sympathetic media, the methods of the North and South are comparably
similar, yet garnered varying levels of success. The victor in the propaganda struggle was
undoubtedly the North, as the efforts of its agents and sympathetic connections had
contributed to Britain’s maintenance of neutrality. Despite its shortcomings at the war’s
beginning, the military and political turnaround the Union experienced in turn helped to
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salvage its image. Where in 1861, the U.S had been both unable to strike a decisive blow
against the Confederacy and unwilling to expand the aims of the war beyond
reunification, from 1863 onward its public stature improved. Pivotal Union victories of
the war – Antietam, Vicksburg, Gettysburg, Atlanta and more – gradually neutralized the
Confederacy’s capability to wage war, in spite of the early doubts and dubious
predications from British publications like The Times. The inclusion of emancipation was
an essential step to securing the foreign policy aims laid out by Lincoln and Seward
concerning the prevention of outside intervention. In issuing his Proclamation in 1863,
Lincoln presented the war as one between freedom and bondage. Popular reaction to this
new approach did the rest of the work, as British public reluctance to interfere in such a
struggle effectively kept its leaderships’ hands tied, whether there was an interest in
doing so or not.
However, it must also be noted that there are successes in the Confederate’s
efforts to sway the public, despite failing in its primary goal to place further pressure on
the government to aid the South. Early appeals portraying it as under assault by a
tyrannical North, won it some sympathy among the British public as the underdog. The
Union’s justifications for war were presented as overbearing and hypocritical to the
nation’s founding principles. The Confederacy was also indirectly aided by unaffiliated
elements of the British press. This included the aforementioned Times, which derided the
unorganized response and poor military performance of the Union in the opening months
of the war. Arguments concerning the economic demands for Southern cotton, though
they met the same overall failure as the official approach to ‘cotton diplomacy,’ also
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presented limited success, evidenced by British investment in smuggling the product, as
well as the organized mill-worker harassment of pro-Union meetings.
Furthermore, even while he was unable to fulfill the aims of his venture, Henry
Hotze had effectively established a network of connections across Britain and the
continent, allowing his and others’ work the potential to reach a larger audience. As
earlier noted, Hotze and his contemporaries operated on limited funds from the
Confederate government, a result of poor immediate returns and the numerous warrelated economic pressures upon the South. That such coordination could be achieved in
such circumstances is impressive, despite the ideology that its creators attempted to
spread. Even so, such efforts could not continue to fight the increasingly uphill battle for
the Confederate cause abroad. On the failures of his paper and other ventures, Hotze lays
part of the blame with both Europe and the counter-effort of the U.S. In the last weeks of
The Index, the agent wrote of its performance, noting: “In Europe we were looked down
upon as a mere organ of the Confederate Government,” a characteristic “described in the
United States as “the rebel organ.””139 Such a designation, particularly as the issue of
slavery rose to the forefront, could not be overcome. The bulk of public interest had
shifted away from actions that would directly aid the South.
In addressing foreign public opinion on the American Civil War, it must be
understood that it was not static. Did Union and Confederate propaganda have a visible
impact upon the course of British neutrality? Neither group’s appeals achieved immediate
results, both encountering challenges to overcome, as well as failure, early on. Certainly
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the efforts of American agents and sympathizers enhanced public knowledge of the
conflict and its effect upon the North and South. Despite limited circulation and the
biases in their presentation, publications like The Index and The London American were
still conduits of information, covering the details of the war as they could be obtained. As
spectators of the war, the sentiments of the British public mirrored its development, but
were primarily shaped by their own shifting interests and influences. These changes in
attitude, resulting from the tide of the war, a downturn in the British economy, or by
being otherwise linked to political events in Europe, reflect the potential for greater
fluidity. Therefore, a general definition beyond the popular interpretation of British
ambivalence is difficult to assign, as the interests of the British public, like its
government, shifted throughout the war. While Britain’s public remained indifferent to
the conflict on the whole, tensions and pressures both internal and external threatened to
serve as the catalysts to calls for action.
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CHAPTER 3
Throughout the Civil War, President Lincoln held concerns over the threat that a
secondary conflict with a foreign power, particularly Britain, posed to a nation divided.
However, the prospect of his concerns becoming reality increasingly diminished before
war’s end. Moreover, beyond conflict with the Native American tribes of the west, the
nation wouldn’t enter into a major conflict with a foreign entity until the turn of century –
in the era of American imperialism. But while the spring of 1865 saw the end of the Civil
War, the impact of the conflict upon the global affairs and the foreign relations of the
United States did not fade. While the nation attempted to rebuild and reunify itself after
four years of war, other nations, including the United Kingdom, also dealt with its
consequences. Contrary to the early expectations of European governments witnessing
the outbreak of secession and the early stages of the war, the American experiment had
not collapsed. The principles of democracy, liberty and union had overcome those of
slavery and secession. Though a costly experience in terms of resources and lives, the
United States would gradually emerge from its division a stronger presence in the
Western hemisphere, rededicated to enforcing the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.
For the Anglo-American relationship at this time, the end of the war marked the
beginnings of a shift in dialogue. While not yet reaching the level of cooperation seen in
the conflicts of the early 20th century, the impact of a Union victory in the Civil War had
a ripple effect lasting years after its end. Controversial moments of the war remained
engrained in public memory, brought up in later debate as justifications or precedent. The
British Empire would experience notable changes brought about by the conflict,
including prominent, ongoing issues concerning social and political reform at home, as
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well as the structure of their Canadian possessions. Finally, a particularly divisive point
of contention – one that persisted into the following decade – developed in the form of
the Alabama Claims. This debate necessitated outside arbitration, evoking review of
maritime law and a neutral Britain’s responsibility. This period of post-war transition
continued earlier, war-time dialogues, and worked to address the lingering issues and
concerns of both nations. As such, it represents a key part of the growing trans-Atlantic
dialogue between the United States and United Kingdom in the latter half of the 19th
Century.
While the conflict itself had ended, and its wounds had begun to heal, the Civil
War’s presence in public memory and opinion did not fade as easily in its aftermath. In
the United States, the nation began its recovery from the loss of President Lincoln, with
Congress and the Johnson administration beginning the implementation of Southern
Reconstruction. Foreman notes that, in order to further the aims of the restoring the
Union and the pursuance of peace, the nation entered a period of demobilization of its
military forces. By 1870, the army and navy had shrunk to a fraction of their wartime
size.140 For the defeated forces of the Confederacy, “a general amnesty” was offered by
President Johnson, intended to be a step towards the reentry of the South into the
Union.141 A strong standing army was still not feasible, nor desired by the American
populace, particularly among the occupied states of the South. However, even with the
surrender of General Lee’s forces in the April of 1865, and the subsequent collapse of the
Confederate government, some remained at war. Elements of the Confederacy persisted,
unaware of, or unwilling, to follow Lee’s actions and surrender themselves to the North.
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Throughout the war, and particularly during its last weeks, Confederates had
sought refuge in neutral territories. Some eluded capture by fleeing south into the
Caribbean or Mexico, while others sought to cross the northern border into British
Canada. Those seeking escape from U.S. authority ranged from the common soldier to
the leadership of the Confederate government. As noted in earlier discussion of the CSS
Alabama’s crew, many of those who survived its final battle - including its captain,
Raphael Semmes - were rescued from the water by the sympathetic crew of a British
yacht. A bystander to the 1864 engagement, the Deerhound, which bore them to
Southampton, England, had identified itself as a neutral vessel.142 However, the victors of
the battle off Cherbourg, France - the crew of the USS Kearsarge under Captain Winslow
- had not intended for their quarry to escape their later attempts to retrieve them. On the
battle, A.K. Browne notes that, although Winslow had permitted the Deerhound to aid in
the recovery of the sailors, his presumptions and “confidence in the integrity of a neutral”
was “misplaced.”143 That prize was soon lost, as Semmes and his men, including some of
British origin, would subsequently disperse upon arrival in Southampton. These actions
were particularly dishonorable in Winslow’s view as, prior to Deerhound’s aid, the
Alabama’s crew had surrendered themselves.144 Thus, the impact of the Alabama’s
destruction was blunted, her experienced officers free to join other efforts in this late
stage of the war.
For the few high-ranking Confederate officials who escaped, nations like Britain
and France presented opportunity for their new lives in exile. The last Secretary of State
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for the Davis Administration, Judah P. Benjamin, managed to evade the fate of his
president, his disguised travel through the South enabling him to reach safe passage from
the Gulf.145 From there, he traveled to Europe, where he would draw upon the
connections of Southern diplomats like Mason and Slidell for aid in avoiding further
personal upheaval. Entering a career in the English legal system, Benjamin kept
correspondence with other exiles in London, later learning of his criminal indictment - in
absentia - alongside other Southern leaders for their role in bringing about the war.146 For
Confederates abroad, their evasion of capture served as a frustration for those that wished
to pursue justice, as they either remained in exile or else returned years later. Their
fortunes run parallel with those of the many former Confederate figures that still resided
in the US, who returned to positions of power as the plans for the Reconstruction of the
South weakened and collapsed.
Of special note among these cases is the last documented surrender of
Confederate forces, occurring that November. Placed under the command of Captain
James Waddell, the CSS Shenandoah was another of those ships built in British shipyards
and secretly purchased and fitted for use by the Confederacy. After its acquisition in
1864, the ship had made its way into the east, narrowly avoiding confiscation by
Australian authorities due to its origins and partially British crew – a violation of the
Empire’s Foreign Enlistment Act.147 The CSS Shenandoah then traveled into the northern
Pacific, and had continued to target American whaling and shipping well into the summer
following the Southern defeat. Only through news acquired from their later prizes, as
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well as neutral vessels, did the crew learn of the fate of their erstwhile nation in the war.
Believing in the potential risk of the accusation of piracy had they surrendered to United
States authority, Waddell avoided travelling to closer American ports along the West
Coast.148 Their attacks would be seen as having been performed outside of the war, with
their best chance at evading capture being with a neutral power. Therefore, the
Shenandoah’s crew made for Europe, travelling to the port of Liverpool, where the
Confederacy’s naval agents in England had earlier operated.
Upon arrival in England, the ship was handed over to British Admiralty’s
authority. The resulting legal intrigue over the fate of the vessel and its crew drew in
Waddell, the U.S. Minister to Britain, Charles Adams, and the British Admiralty. Ship
officer William Whittle notes the view of Mr. Adams, that both should have been turned
over to his nation’s jurisdiction. The actions of the Shenandoah in the Pacific continued
even after their first knowledge of Lee’s defeat, and thus were more easily argued to be
acts of piracy rather than wartime belligerency.149 But the review of British law presented
an alternative. The US would be given the ship, its fittings and other property, but on the
continued holding of its crew and the prospect of their arrest, there were doubts. In a
letter presenting their opinion, included by Whittle in his recollections of the cruise, the
argument favored their release:
“With respect to any of the persons on the Shenandoah who cannot be
immediately proceeded against and detained under legal warrant upon any
criminal charge, we are not aware of any ground upon which they can properly be
prevented from going on shore and disposing of themselves as they think fit, and
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we cannot advise her Majesty's government to assume or exercise the power of
keeping them under any kind of restraint.”150
Captain Waddle’s evidence and documentation for his crew’s travels were deemed
legally acceptable. Thus, while the Shenandoah would later be placed under the custody
of the United States - later to be sold in England - its remaining officers and crew went
ashore.
The Shenandoah Confederates were all released, even those British sailors whose
service aboard the ship were by law violations of Britain’s neutrality. Facing questions
from British officers attempting to ascertain their nationality, these men simply lied about
their home country, to the point that their questioners put the matter aside.151 The
decisions made by the British further frustrated post-war discourse between the U.S. and
U.K. Dispersing after their release, some men remained in England, joining other former
Confederate naval figures - such as Admiral James Bulloch and his brother Irvine - in
their shared, self-imposed exile. Chaffin suggests that many “were forced to look beyond
England to rebuild their lives,” with officers relocating to other parts of the Empire, or to
Latin America, either never or clandestinely returning to the US.152 As to the limited
wealth taken by the ship from its last prizes, this also went unrecovered by the U.S. What
meagre funds were left, depleted during its long voyage, had instead been split between
the crew before their dispersal.153 Understandably, this course of events factored into the
anger of those in the North who had been affected by the Shenandoah’s predation upon
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U.S. merchants. These grievances would subsequently be incorporated as part of the
ongoing American argument for the payment of raider-inflicted damages by Britain.
Naturally, Britain’s part in the escape of fugitive Confederates, coupled with
lingering resentment over different wartime controversies and other past slights left some
in the U.S. embittered. Anger understandably persisted over the idea that leading figures
in Britain, with an apparent reluctance to stop avenues of support and illicit trade with the
Confederacy, had maintained sympathy for the South. The idea that the South’s repeated
exploitation of British neutrality, and the perception of a British willingness to abet such
behavior, popularized the idea that it’s action, or inaction, had served to prolong the war.
This view persisted long after 1865, as evidenced in an 1889 article by the BritishAmerican financier, Henry Clews, who wrote that such sympathies were rampant in the
upper levels of the Palmerston government. On the idea of intervention, Clews writes:
“Looking at the question in the light of these facts and others elicited in the debate
on intervention, I think it is safe to state that probably the majority of the Cabinet,
and certainly the large majority in Parliament, were morally responsible for
imparting aid and comfort to the South, and thus prolonging the struggle and the
effusion of blood which they seemed so anxious to stop, although, through the
able and praiseworthy tactics of its leaders, the Cabinet narrowly escaped
technical and official responsibility.”154
Clews’s argument reflects much of the lasting resentment directed at Great Britain that
arose in the North and among its foreign supporters. Specific targets of this frustration
during the war had included John Roebuck and William Gladstone, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer under Palmerston. The role of the latter was actually defended by Clews, who
argued against published misunderstandings that Gladstone was for the breakup of the
Union, though Clews does criticize the man’s early belief in an inevitable southern
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victory.155 His rise to Prime Minister, three separate times in the twenty years after the
war, would place him into the spotlight, his past speeches and positions a target of
American press that shared the remainder of Clews’s view. While the accuracy of such
interpretations of the British position is debatable, certainly the visible presence of
Unionist support in Parliament was outweighed by proponents of either continued
neutrality or the South.
President Lincoln’s pro-emancipation move in 1863 changed the dynamics of the
war and what each side stood for, particularly among foreign audiences. Where before
confusion had arisen regarding what justification the Union had for fighting the South,
the incorporation of anti-slavery ideals shifted sympathies for the remainder of the
conflict. For the U.K.’s reform-minded populace, even those for whom the fires of
abolition had waned after their own successes against slavery, would consider Lincoln
the ‘Great Emancipator.’ But the principles laid out by Lincoln and others concerning
liberty and rights for the enslaved in America sparked another reaction, developing
alongside British opinion. Long brewing political reform interests rose to greater
prominence during the war, with British positions on the American conflict often
correlating to support or opposition for generating change at home. But such movements
had arisen before, early attempts failing to generate radical change in the fabric of British
politics. It was not until 1867, two years after the war’s end, that notable progress on
addressing the causes of the reformers developed.
In the intervening years leading up to the Civil War, Britain had experienced its
own political and social division. Drawn along lines of class and labor, reform
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movements among the working class rose and fell repeatedly during the 19th century,
focusing on issues including the expansion of suffrage. Periods of unrest in early
Industrial Era-Britain, which saw both peaceful campaigns and violent riots, pressured
Parliament to take steps to curb the social and political strife. Limited action in the 1830s
occurred in the form of the Reform Act of 1832, which primarily benefitted the middle
classes of manufacturing centers, extending and standardizing the political franchise.156
But for the remainder of the lower classes, their issues with the system of representation
remained unaddressed. Beginning in the late 1830s and going into 1840s, the Chartism
movement, which called for the political suffrage of British workingmen and a stronger
political presence for the working class in their representation, initially formed as
separate movements across the United Kingdom.157 But the cause generated little political
action, Parliamentary leadership preferring to evade the prospect of achieving significant
reform of democracy.
Writing on the fluctuations experienced by Chartists, the Scottish writer, Thomas
Carlyle, argued that the actions of the British government to satisfy past reform
movements had not addressed the root of the issues from which they sprung. In his
discussion of the ‘Condition-of-England Question,’ Carlyle expressed concern over the
plight of the worker, and the mistakes made by the upper-class and Parliament in their
consideration of reform. Summarizing the issues, Carlyle writes:
“These are inquiries on which, had there been a proper ‘Condition-of-England
question,’ some light would have been thrown, before ‘torch-meetings’ arose to
illustrate them. Far as they lie out of the course of Parliamentary routine, they
should have been gone into, should have been glanced at, in one or the other
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fashion. A legislature making laws for the working classes, in total uncertainty as
to these things, is legislating in the dark; not wisely, nor to good issues.”158
Carlyle’s stance on the issue reflects the problems faced by the British government in
attempting to address reform interests such as those of the Chartists. But the views
espoused by Chartism were not entirely buried with the deterioration of the platform,
resurging in both the 1850s and 60s, feeding into successor movements.
The outbreak of the Civil War presented a challenge for political reformers,
particularly those that drew upon American examples in their calls for change. Radical
figures in British politics supported reforms that benefitted the working-class, including
the Liberal statesman John Bright. Bright argued against the hesitation of the government
to adapt and expand the institutions of democracy, often invoking the American system in
his Parliamentary speeches.159 But political turmoil, secession, and the bloody war in the
United States undermined Bright’s idealized political vision for Britain. The instability
and conflict gave ammunition to foreign detractors of greater democracy, whose
influence factored into early British attitudes on Union prospects in the war.160 Dubrulle
notes Bright’s continued attacks on traditional political stubbornness and fear over the
prospect of ‘Americanizing’ their systems of government.161 But the opponents of Bright
and other radicals criticized such rhetoric, pointing to faults in the structure of the
American experiment that had widened with time.
Opposition could derive from varied backgrounds, but prominent voices against
the idealized reformation of British politics could be found in the nation’s Conservative
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Party. One such perspective, voiced by figures such as Richard Spence, was that the
breakup of the U.S. had occurred as an inevitable result of the nation’s growth, a trend its
democratic systems could not match.162 Wartime propaganda, such as Henry Hotze’s The
Index, painted Bright’s position as “anti-aristocratic,” a hatred for the themes of social
order shared by South gentility and the British upper class.163 Pro-Union and pro-reform
sentiments aligned more often than not, becoming entangled in the view of those opposed
to either group’s interests. But opinions change, and public sympathy, if not full support,
for both issues grew increasingly vocal. As the Civil War coalesced around issues with
which a greater number could more easily connect - emancipation and liberty rather than
an attempt to prevent secession – British reformers had a new source of inspiration to
draw upon.
While earlier attempts at achieving change had poor to mixed results, the latter
half of the 19th century provided fresh resolve and inspiration. For the different labor
movements and working class organizations throughout the United Kingdom, events
across the Atlantic served as a needed catalyst for their work to secure a stronger political
voice. Considering the role of the emancipation, Jones suggests that the Proclamation
“signified Lincoln’s commitment to a new and improved Union that was revolutionary in
spirit.”164 For the British worker, that commitment suggested an evaluation of their own
social situation and presence in their nation’s politics. The aftermath of the war, with
promises for the further expansion of rights and the political franchise to African
Americans in the U.S. through the Reconstruction amendments, provided for further
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comparison going into the 1870s. If these steps towards political equality could succeed
in the United States, why had such advancement been slow to occur in Britain?
Subsequent public reaction to the lasting influence of Lincoln’s role in these issues
indicates an inspirational nature around the president’s work.
Connections between such feeling and the interests of the period’s rising workers’
advocates, including Karl Marx, reflect the changing social interests of the era, forming
the origins for the labor movements of the later 19th century. Jones notes that, although he
himself was disappointed with the limitations of Lincoln’s actions in 1863, Marx working with Friedrich Engels in England - had earlier commended the framing of the
conflict as one that promoted “equal opportunity for all mankind.”165 Prominent figures,
such as Marx and Engels, were not alone in their belief. The response of groups such as
the Manchester mill-workers, largely united in ardent support of Lincoln and his
intentions for emancipation in their 1862 letter, reflects the attention paid to the
conflict.166 It was not solely an economic interest, going beyond the cotton shortages and
unemployment in Britain’s textile industry, but social and ideological ones as well.
Against the predictions, and in some cases hope, of European governments, the principles
of democracy espoused by the concepts of the American approach endured. The survival
of the American experiment and its success in advancing the demise of the U.S.’s own
slavery institution furthered reform sentiment. With self-reflection on the nature of
democracy the United Kingdom came escalating calls for similar expansion of said
principles across the Atlantic.
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In detailing the groups that emerged amid the late-Civil War feeling concerning
class status and political inequality, differences within their shared interests split
supporters. The Reform League and National Reform Union were among the most
notable branches within the resurgent movement for change - the former created in 1865,
the latter forming a year before.167 A left-wing group, the League advocated consistently
for the spread of political rights, but expanded their platform of issues to encompass other
matters of social and political equality in Britain. Finn describes their appeal as
presenting the principle of expanded suffrage “as a mechanism of social emancipation,”
drawing on themes “of class fear and of class reconciliation.”168 In the same way that the
institution of American slavery faced destruction through emancipation, the reformers of
Britain sought to weaken the chains holding back the lower classes. Comparatively, the
Reform Union represented a more moderate stance among Britain’s liberal groups, less
radical in their approach to achieving change. This perspective is clearly reflected in their
arguments for reform; Finn noting that the leadership - many from Manchester - was
“hostile to organized labor,” and “urged workers to abandon combination in restraint of
trade for political cooperation with the middle class.”169 Despite the differences in the
scope of their divergent platforms, the two organizations would collaborate to push for
greater support of favorable liberal policies as they were debated in Parliament.
The first major product of these reform efforts in the immediate post-Civil War
period, only a single step on the path towards political change in Britain, arrived in 1867.
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An earlier attempt, brought up in 1866, had been in response to a wave of resurgent
activism and demonstrations concerning representation and participation in Britain’s
House of Commons. The performance of that bill - which followed Prime Minister
Palmerston’s death, and was proposed by his successor Lord Russell – paralleled the
decline of his government. Saunders describes Russell’s introduction of the bill as
“making a decisive break with the domestic conservatism of his predecessor,” its failure
contributing to the breakup of the Liberal coalition, and the transition into a Conservative
one.170 Under the new government, led by Lord Derby once again, Parliament returned to
debate over an act to expand enfranchisement among men of the working class. The issue
couldn’t be ignored, as the publicity of continuing protests supported a perception of
widespread appeal and clamor for reform.171 Conservatives such as Benjamin Disraeli
believed that they could structure a bill that could promise reform, but intended their
actions to further undermine the position of the Liberals.
Fierce debate between Conservatives and Liberals like Gladstone - over measures
determining suffrage - occurred amid increased outside pressure to act. This led to the
adoption of amendments that increased enfranchisement, including a radical one from
Gladstone that eliminated the practice of compounding – allowing for the direct payment
of the rates required from renting tenants in order to vote.172 The result of Disraeli’s
gamble became known as the Reform Act of 1867, a more radical outcome than had
initially been envisioned. It was the second such Reform Act in 19th century Britain, and
its passage soon proved a significant miscalculation on the part of Conservatives. While
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the political franchise had become more open, significantly increasing the voting
population, it did not translate into Conservative support. Saunders notes that the move
by Liberals to “assert their ownership of the bill,” ahead of the Parliamentary elections in
1868, working to undermining Conservative claims and, subsequently, returning to
power.173 The reforms of 1867 would serve as a basis for further adjustments and for later
Acts concerning political representation, going into the early 20th century. While the U.K.
had still not adopted democratic principles at the level of the idealized view of America
held by radicals such as Bright, it was a an effort to address the growing interest in
achieving such reform.
The war to the south regularly threatened to draw in the colonial provinces that
made up British North America, today the nation of Canada. Throughout the conflict,
multiple incidents along the border and in Canadian waters raised questions of the British
territory’s neutrality, and by extension that of its parent nation. The eastern regions,
including Provincial Canada and the islands of Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia, had long been deemed at risk to the interests of American expansionism.
Throughout the first half of the 19th century, the U.S. had more than tripled in size - a
rapid course of growth which had brought it into conflict with Mexico, to the loss of a
significant portion of that nation’s territory. Growing American public and political
enthusiasm over the themes of Manifest Destiny raised British concern. Would the spread
of similar ideas within the U.S., instead directed at their northern neighbor, prevail and
escalate a dispute over land into a full war? The lengthy borderline with the United States

173

Saunders, Democracy and the Vote, 13.

97

presented repeated challenges, with the very real possibility of an invasion of British
holdings in the event of war between the two nations.
Americans and Canadians were no stranger to war and discord between one
another, as far back as the colonial era. Past confrontations ranged from an attempted
American invasion in the War of 1812 to intermittent skirmishes, clashes and flare-ups
over territorial claims on the border. An example of one such case lies with the
Aroostook War of 1838-39. Rising over land claims between New Brunswick and
Americans in Maine, the war did not include direct fighting, rather a period of escalation
between militia groups on either side of the disputed lands. The standoff was ended
through a diplomatic resolution in the form of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty signed in
1842.
The compromise reached by then Secretary of State Daniel Webster and Baron
Ashburton of Britain included multiple compromises addressing issues later brought up
again during Civil War-era negotiations. In addition to settling the matter of the disputed
lands, the agreement also included an outline for naval cooperation against the African
slave trade, a precursor to the terms of the Lyons-Seward treaty in 1862.174 This later
agreement built upon the work of 1842 in a shift brought about by Seward as part of his
effort to ease wartime tension. Moreover, it laid out the terms for extradition for those
“charged with the crime of murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or Piracy, or
arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged paper.”175 The clarification of this
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policy in 1842 connects into a central point of contention between Canada and the U.S.
twenty years later, namely the former’s role in Confederate activities against the North.
Beyond the matter of the Aroostook dispute, the repeated occurrence of such disputes,
though they were mediated through diplomacy, displayed Canada’s vulnerability to
American pressures. In the event of an actual war, the Empire’s ability to reinforce the
region would face a test of speed, competing with the U.S.’s ability to mobilize a
successful invasion. But even while this external threat remained, the Canadian provinces
faced problems entirely their own as well, rooted in the region’s politics.
Issues in the governance of their North American territories had plagued British
interests in this portion of the Empire. Stagnating levels of government accountability in
the face of fluctuating economic conditions and provincial growth suggested increasing
political turmoil. In an 1836 essay concerning the trouble with the Canadas – separated
into Lower and Upper Canada before the first union in 1841 - John Roebuck expressed
the view that the former was mired in political turmoil and government irresponsibility,
the latter on course for the same downwards spiral.176 Lower Canada formed from a
combination of the Quebec region’s earlier French inhabitants and subsequent waves of
British settlement, while the latter was predominantly English, though lower in
population.177 In introducing a structure for greater self-governance to Lower Canada,
Roebuck argued that such change had gradually tainted the colony’s political system
since its inception. Five particular evils were outlined around the problems plaguing
political representation and the Canadian legislature, the House of Assembly. Drawing on
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the varied complaints raised by their inhabitants, Roebuck identified them as relating to:
finance, revenues and the expenditure of government resources; the administration of
justice and the politicization of judges; funding for the spread of education; Parliament’s
own activity in trying to influence “laws regulating the internal affairs of the colony;” and
perception of favoritism in the structure of political offices and councils.178 Attempts to
resolve these matters brought about proposals for the significant restructuring of
government in the Canadas, unification being one such solution to better address the
interests and grievances of the colonies’ population.
The conflict of 1861-65 would place further pressure on Canadian and British
leadership to reevaluate the governance of the territory. Canada’s geographic location
presented opportunity for both North and South alike during the Civil War, largely due to
the extensive border it shared with the Union. Operatives of the Confederacy exploited
the fluidity of the border, staging plots and attacks on border communities from Canada.
This included the raid on St. Alban’s, Vermont, in which a group of Confederate agents
robbed several banks and killed one person in their escape.179 Northern anger over the
raid intensified when - after several of the raiders were arrested - those held for an
extradition trial were set free, disappearing before the Canadian governor, Lord Monck,
could order their arrest once more.180 The ability of the agents to walk free, regardless of
Canadian attempts to recapture them, did little assuage frustration across the border. In
their eyes, the 1842 agreement made between Webster and Ashburton, which had
included terms concerning extradition, was being undermined by inaction.
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However, the St. Alban’s raid ultimately proved more of a threat than a benefit to
Confederate efforts abroad. The venture had been orchestrated without the knowledge of
Jacob Thompson, the Confederacy’s Special Service official in Canada, who feared that it
would undermine his work in the provinces. Thompson, whose task was the spreading of
“anti-Northern feeling in Canada,” did not want such actions to inspire the opposite
reaction.181 He would go on to organize other schemes to sow disarray in the North, one
involving an failed attempt at the burning of New York City in November, 1864, to
spread fear behind Union lines.182 Northern anger over the ability of these operatives to
freely move back and forth across the border, either evading or facing lax action on the
part of Canadian authorities, would force Canadian officials - as well the British Foreign
Ministry – to take some action to curtail such behavior. But arrests and diplomatic
warnings in the last years of the war did not change what had already been allowed to
occur, and the U.S. took a step towards retaliation.
The potential for an aggressive Northern response to any prospective intervention
or recognition of Southern independence pressured the Empire to devote resources to
counter such threats. As noted in the first chapter, while Lincoln’s focus remained on the
avoidance of an unnecessary second conflict, the military vulnerability of Canada and
other holdings was considered by Secretary Seward in his interaction with British
officials. But wartime tension between the North and Canada was not solely expressed
through military threats or the reinforcement of the latter by a concerned Parliament.
British North America benefitted from important trade and military compromises with
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the United States, agreements that fell under review as public and congressional
animosity over Canada’s inaction grew.
Two such deals in particular, both made between Britain and the U.S., fell under
the growing spotlight. One was the 1855 Reciprocity Treaty, promoting free trade across
the border, though some manufactured goods from the US could be tariffed when
entering Canada. Mahin argues that the “the treaty’s benefits to the United States had
been debatable before the war and had eroded during the war due to increased domestic
demand,” and as it permitted the cancellation of the agreement by either party after ten
years, popular support in Congress pushed its repeal in early 1865.183 The long-standing
military agreement concerning the militarization of the Great Lakes, the Rush-Bagot
Treaty of 1817, also faced criticism and scrutiny at this late point in the war.
Congressmen such as the radical Charles Sumner voiced increasingly anti-British
rhetoric, suggesting that it could also face repeal.184 Such a move would set a new course
for border relations between the two powers, a prospect few British officials wished to
realize. But Seward took further action on the issue, suggesting after the St. Albans Raid
that U.S. would consider the armament of forces in the Great Lakes, Mahin noting the
explicit link made connecting “naval armaments to British enforcement of its neutrality
policy.”185 Occurring near to the end of the conflict, the winding down of the war helped
to avoid a new one to the North. Outside the minds of figures like Sumner, the idea of a
direct military reprisal for wartime grievances caused by Britain would gradually fall
away from the wider public interest.
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The end to the Civil War did not put an end to the dangers posed to British
Canada, and the years that followed presented significant change in the political structure
of the territory. Though none of the feared attacks from the North during the war had ever
developed, other issues emerged along the border, again threatening Canadian security events in which the United States played a role yet again. The point of contention here
concerned the Fenian raids of 1866, a reversal of the wartime situation regarding the
Confederate presence north of the boundaries. These attacks on Canadian soil, launched
from the American side of the border, were largely carried out by militia groups of Irish
Republicans. Multiple incursions against the provinces, from Northeastern United States
and from around the Great Lakes, resulted in casualties on both sides. The Fenians were
primarily comprised of fighters utilizing guerilla-like tactics, with many being veterans of
the Civil War - Irish immigrants recruited for the war effort amid waves of immigration
from the island.186 From the Canadian and British perspective, such raids could not have
been organized without the knowledge of Americans across the border. The lingering
animosity towards the British within the U.S. government, from Sumner and other
Radical Republicans suggested to those in Canada that the attacks of the Fenians,
unsuccessful as they were, served as their retribution - a continuation of interest in
weakening the British presence in North America.
The effect of treaty alterations and the Fenian attacks, coupled with the British
government’s exhaustion regarding the longstanding concerns over American interest in
the northern regions, applied pressure for a significant change in the British approach to
Canada. The key factors in the resulting transformation were based in the unification of
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the provinces, the goal being to strengthen the new government’s organization and
centralization. In 1867, the first iteration of a modern Canada was established via the
British North America Act, merging the province of Canada, Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick together, still under the British crown. In terms of self-governance, the
Confederation as a whole was led by a single Parliamentary body.187 The characteristics
woven into the new structure took into account the events that had preceded the
American Civil War, the lower legislatures of the individual provinces tied to the
centralized federal body, an effort to avoid the divisions seen in American secession
arguments. However, concerning its impact upon American relations, old habits tended to
endure. Even with the formation of the new Canadian Confederation, those Americans
who still maintained a bitterness towards their northern neighbors oddly kept the view
that Canadians would want to be annexed by the U.S.
The divisive factors that had fractured the United States, catalyzing the decline
into the Secession Crisis and war, only began to be addressed in the aftermath of the war.
Domestic issues, including the rebuilding of the South and the condition of freed slaves,
remained matters that would take years to address, even then remaining problems well
into the 20th century. Similarly, in foreign policy, certain matters remained unsettled
between the reunited U.S. and the war’s neutral bystanders, France and Britain among
them. An immediate example of the restoration of American attentions to their foreign
policy and North American interests lay to the South. The Second French Empire’s
occupation of Mexico since 1861, had consistently been a subject of American
diplomatic warnings to Napoleon III’s rule. Operating a proxy state in Mexico under its
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installed ruler Emperor Maximilian I, the French presence violated the ideas set forth in
the Monroe Doctrine. By 1867, the movement of U.S. troops to the border with Mexico,
short of an actual invasion, had pressured the French to withdraw, allowing Mexican
republicans to overthrow Maximilian.188 In the case of Anglo-American ties, Britain had
long since withdrawn from the French effort in Mexico, its initial participation in the
venture based upon attaining repayment of loans given to the nation’s previous
government. Beyond the animosity Americans still felt over British ‘neutrality’ and
perceptions of Southern sympathy, negotiations over diplomatic issues stemming from
the maritime controversies of the war continued.
At the heart of these lingering arguments were the financial damages incurred by
American shipping as a result of the predation of Confederate commerce raiders during
the war, many of which were built in British shipyards. The CSS Alabama, being the
most infamous and one of the most successful of these vessels, would lend her name to
the resultant debate over British responsibility for her actions at sea. Negotiation over the
Alabama Claims, as they came to be known, were a regular topic in Anglo-American
diplomacy between 1863 and 1872. Legal analyses raised questions of the loopholes and
exploitations of maritime law that had not only allowed the Alabama to be constructed,
but had aided in her escape.189 Knowledge of the cruiser’s purpose had spread, with
Minister Adams and Lord Russell both aware of Confederate interests in the vessel. The
arguments of the former, suggesting it was a violation of the integrity of British
neutrality, were met by inaction from Russell’s Foreign Offices, which seemed unsure
what action it could legally take to halt the ship’s construction. Mersi describes a general
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confusion in understanding of British law, particularly in regards to earlier 19th century
precedents regulating foreign enlistment, leading to divergent interpretations of what the
law actually was.190 With the beginning of direct negotiation on the matter in 1869, the
legal questions of responsibility in the affairs of neutral and belligerent powers would see
evaluation and change.
American trade interests, especially those that had directly suffered from the
actions of the commerce raiders, clamored for recompense. Anglophobic congressmen
like Sumner called for increasingly high payments as recompense, even laying “the entire
cost of the war after Gettysburg in 1863 at Britain’s feet,” over two billion dollars in total
at the time.191 Varying perspectives of Britain’s role in the war mingled together, the idea
that its actions had prolonged the war gaining traction. Yet the demands of Sumner and
others did little to bring Britain to the negotiating table. While responsibility for the
actions of the Alabama was one matter, pinning further financial damages on top of that
only served to anger a British government still unwilling to accept blame in the first
place. Between 1868 and 1869 – years which saw the return of a Liberal government,
under Gladstone, and the election of the Grant Administration - an opportunity for
negotiation on the issue presented itself. First reviewing an earlier agreement between
American Minister Reverdy Johnson and British Foreign Minister Clarendon to establish
commission on claims, both Grant and Congress would reject this approach. For many,
particularly the more Radical wings controlling Congress, the agreement did not address
the full scope of Britain’s culpability in the Confederacy’s actions.192 Britain remained
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disinterested in negotiating over the broader matters of the war, but the persistence of
American officials served to distract from issues more immediate to the concerns of the
Empire. Mahin connects the outbreak and course of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 to a
shift in the British perspective, the monitoring of the balance of power on the European
continent demanding more of their attention.193 Thus, talks between the two nations
proceeded more swiftly going into 1871, with a tempered rather than radical approach to
the negotiations.
The talks over the settlement of the claims consisted of legal debate and argument
over how such a payment could be fairly determined. Arguments remained over the
interpretation of British neutrality and precedent in maritime law. However, a consensus
on how to move forward was eventually reached. Signed in the spring of 1871, the Treaty
of Washington laid out a plan to resolve the claims once and for all by the following year.
The terms called for an international arbitration of the claims, through a meeting of
representatives from the U.S., U.K, Brazil, Italy, and Switzerland, to be carried out in
Geneva.194 Earlier plans for settlement only through a British-American commission
proved too contentious, requiring the input of third parties. Furthermore, the Treaty set
forth new rules concerning the expectations for neutral powers going forward, points
similar to Britain’s own policies regarding port access and ship construction during the
war, now set in stone for legal precedent.195 Attending representatives would review the
case, examine legal precedent and justification, and determine what would be done
concerning the prospect of compensation for American losses. The agreement reached in
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1872 favored the American position on direct damages inflicted by the Alabama –
indirect costs of Britain’s role having been dropped from the U.S. representatives’
arguments. Their resolution directed Britain to pay $15 million to the U.S., thereby
ending the matter.196 Although the act of doing so caused some consternation and
embarrassment in Britain, the agreement of the Claims kept the two nations on the path of
peace with one another.
With the resolutions emerging from the Treaty of Washington, and the arbitration
of the dispute at Geneva, both nations were at last able to move past the divisions of the
1860s. Britain, though still slighted by the cost of the agreed-upon damages, was more
desirous to put the affairs of 1861-65 behind them. Events in Europe, including rivalry
and imperialist conflict between Russia, Prussia, and France, increasingly necessitated
British attentions. As a result, the last significant point of contention between the United
States and United Kingdom stemming from the Civil War had been addressed. Still rivals
rather than allies, and still limited in their direct cooperation on issues beyond trade
matters or the crackdown upon the slave trade, the late and post-Civil War periods
marked the beginnings of a shift in Anglo-American relations.
While the American Civil War ended in the spring of 1865, its impact would
resonate for years after, shaping policy and development in the postwar United States.
But this effect was not limited to the U.S. alone, for through the nation’s foreign
relations, other powers felt the conflict’s effects. Public resentment in the United States
over the role the United Kingdom, and its political leadership, had during the war
dampened relations in the immediate aftermath of war. The perception of Confederate
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sympathies being shared by eminent British statesmen – their stances on intervention and
recognition persisted in particular - endured long after the war, damaging public images
among Americans. The example of Gladstone, particularly during his own periods of
leadership as Prime Minister, shows that memory of his role in British affairs during the
war was not forgotten in the U.S. For the British Empire as a whole, the ramifications of
the Civil War carried notable change. The Empire’s approach to the maintenance and
protection of its North American territories shifted in response to the events of the war,
intended to address concerns over external threats and internal inefficiencies. The
resulting formation of a more cohesive Canadian province set the stage for the modern
structure of the nation, and the gradual path towards its own sovereignty in the 20th
century. Finally, the settlement of the long-standing disputes over the British role in the
actions of the Alabama and other raiders allowed at one fence to be mended.
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Conclusions and Interpretations
In reviewing the effects of the Civil War upon Anglo-American relations, the
conflict finds stronger connections to global events in the mid-19th century. While its
military dimensions remained limited to actions of the North and South against one
another, outside this sphere, the war carried significant consequences. Diplomatic activity
influenced, or was influenced by, not only military success, but by economic, political
and social developments as well. Northern and Southern outreach alike sought to
capitalize on the foreign impacts of the war, among them widespread economic
disruption. Moreover, the effects of the war persisted past its final moments, issues in
foreign policy lingering well beyond 1865.
Three areas of prominence are central to understanding of Anglo-American
foreign policy between 1861 and 1865, shaping the course of the war and post-war
relations. The Trent Affair of November through December, 1861, represents the closest
point to war between the United States and British Empire. The Affair raised questions of
U.S. and British conduct, the rights and protections of neutral powers, and the legality of
the Union blockade. Furthermore, as one of the earliest direct disputes, it carried the
potential to undermine the Union war effort going forward, even if such a secondary
conflict was not in direct support of the Confederacy. For the Confederacy, while their
agents primarily acted from the sidelines of the crisis, it was nonetheless recognized as a
key opportunity to turn the war in their favor early on. The failure of the South to fully
capitalize on their early military victories against the North, and their inability to
influence the outcome of Trent Affair, inhibited their diplomatic impact. The settlement
reached between Seward and Russell not only moved both nations away from the brink,
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but directed Northern policy to the prevention of similar escalations for the duration of
the war.
The actions of the Alabama and other British-built raiders present a second area
of persistent controversy. The supplementation of the Confederate Navy with vessels
contracted or acquired from British shipyards throughout the war brought forth fresh
waves of scrutiny over the neutrality of the Empire. The careers of these commerce
raiders, the Alabama alone inflicting millions in damages to Union shipping, sparked
anger in the North. The slowness with which Britain acquiesced to Union pressure to
investigate, halt or seize such vessels furthered this emotion. The overall impact of the
raiders was not enough to sway the course of the war, particularly as the Confederate
Navy still unable to break the Union blockade. However, that these raiders were acquired
and allowed to inflict damages remained a point of contention into the 1870s. The
lengthy debate over the Alabama Claims necessitated review of legal precedent in
maritime and neutral law, and stressed diplomatic talks in the war’s aftermath, taking
seven years to resolve.
The issues surrounding the cause of emancipation shaped attitudes on the war,
even before slavery began its move to the forefront of the Union war effort in 1863. The
lack of clarity from the U.S. suggested that there was no greater interest in ending the
practice and that its leadership could not enforce such a change while at war. At the same
time, the economic reliance of the South upon slavery and, by extension, the British need
for Southern cotton, further dulled the extent of abolitionist and reform sentiments. The
shifting tide of the war and the message set forth by President Lincoln through
emancipation began a change within British attitudes. The events of 1863-64 altered
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perceptions of the war and helped to catalyze reform causes abroad. The resulting
movements of the later 1860s, sparked by attempts earlier in the century, carry similar
themes for social improvement and drawing upon the example of Lincoln in their work.
The impact of the American Civil War upon the British Empire is evidence of the
conflict’s reach, affecting nations on both sides of the Atlantic World. The direct
diplomatic interaction of American and British officials regularly concerned issues
related to the war, as trade and security remained under threat. The attempts of Northern
and Southern sympathizers to generate or deter support in the Empire, through
propaganda or political action furthers this conclusion. Though a general ambivalence
remained the guiding theme of the British position regarding the conflict, their official
impartiality did not prevent their being reached by its consequences. Despite their official
neutrality, the war left a mark on the Empire. Not the same impact left upon the North
and South, nor as lasting, but one that instilled changes in the aftermath all the same.
Interpreting and Conveying the Narrative
In developing an online interpretation of these issues and events, three themes
guided the creation of the websites – level of detail, accessibility, and navigability. The
site itself, built with the intention to serve as a resource for the interested and as a springboard of ideas for further research, is in actuality two separate locations. The first,
utilizing WordPress, operates as a general discussion of developments and issues in
Anglo-American diplomacy during the Civil War – titled ‘The American Civil War on
the world stage.197 The second, built utilizing Omeka exhibit programs, serves as a
collection of selected primary materials that reflect said issues, with accompanying
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analysis and interpretation, titled ‘A Study of England in the American Civil War.’198
Together, they complement one another, the first presenting a narrative of the subject,
and the latter detailed and structured in such a way as to make finding the materials
relevant to specific parts of this narrative easier.
The extent of the websites’ coverage of the topic remains focused upon the issues
analyzed within the research that contributed to its content. They work to present the war
in an international context, focusing on events and key figures to convey a narrative. The
WordPress location covers each of these areas, providing discussion of developments
throughout the war as well as the roles of key U.S., Confederate, and British individuals
involved in diplomacy and outreach. Prominent issues covered throughout the site
include the Trent Affair, the Alabama’s cruise, and the nature of British public opinion.
The site houses several pages specifically focused upon these issues, utilizing different
formats. For example, multiple timelines place events in America in specific contexts,
including among global developments displaying political or economic interests of
Americans and Europeans. Not only was the war in America distant from many in
Europe, more pressing matters amid the persistent rivalries and competing political
interests – reflected in said timeline – occupied foreign attentions.
As the sites’ aims include fostering greater interest in the subject, including for
research purposes, several aspects of its design work to promote these goals. Alongside
the narrative it presents, the WordPress site includes discussion of materials and
additional, external resources and locations that would provide further information. This
includes specific materials and documents, as well as prominent Civil War-related
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collections containing documents pertaining to this area of the field. This effort is
furthered through collection on the Omeka-based site. It draws examples of document
and image-based materials and displays them in specific collections. Through exhibits,
further narratives are constructed specifically drawing upon related materials on the site.
Each item in the collection has attached descriptions, including context. The origins and
locations of the materials are also included, again allowing visitors to explore the subject
further.
Altogether, the aims of this research - to determine the importance and lasting
consequences of Civil War foreign policy – form the backbone for the websites’ design.
In the same vein as a museum site or an online exhibit, raising interest in the subject and
enhancing understanding of the war are primary goals. They seek to provide visitors with
an informative, accessible narrative of the history surrounding the Anglo-American
relationship in the mid-19th century. By contextualizing the events and issues of the
American Civil War in a more global view, the diplomatic connections of the United
States, and their role in shaping the development of nations, are more clearly understood.
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